JUDGEMENT   
The facts that have spawned the present litigation are fairly straightforward.  The Defendant, a customer of Plaintiff bank applied for and was granted an overdraft facility in the sum of Twenty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH¢20, 000.00) to augment her working capital. Plaintiff avers that the overdraft facility was to attract an agreed interest rate of 23% per annum with a penal rate of 3.5% over and above the agreed rate in the event of the Defendant’s account being overdrawn or payments becoming overdue. The facility granted was secured with a mortgage over Defendant’s property situate at Ablekuma, Accra.  It is the case of the Plaintiff that Defendant, at  the expiration of the facility, had fallen into arrears of  payment and that her indebtedness to Plaintiff stood at One Hundred and Ninety-Three Thousand, Six Hundred and Sixty-Three Ghana Cedis, Twelve Pesewas (GH¢193,663.12) as at 31st October, 2014.  The Defendant, however had in spite of repeated demands on her to make good her indebtedness failed or refused to do so.  It is for this reason that the Plaintiff on 
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the 19th of February, 2015 issued the present writ, claiming the followings against Defendant:  
a) An order for payment of the sum of One hundred and Ninety Three thousand, Six Hundred and Sixty Three Ghana Cedis, Twelve Pesewas (193, 663.12) being the balance due and owing on the facilities granted Plaintiff.  
b). Interest on the said sum of One Hundred and Ninety Three Thousand and Sixty three Thousand Cedis (193,663.12) at the agreed interest rate of 26.5% per annum from 16th September, 2014 to date of final payment.  
c.) Further or in the alternative an order for judicial sale of Defendant’s property described in the Statement of Claim and used as collateral security for the said facility.  
d) Costs.  
The Defendant disputes the Plaintiff’s claim.  Her defence is basically that the Plaintiff neither explained the terms of the facility to her nor advised her to engage legal Counsel even though she is illiterate.  She admitted taking an overdraft facility of Twenty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH¢20, 000.00) but explained that the  facility was a “supplier credit” by which Plaintiff  made payments directly to suppliers  and debited her  account  as and when such payments were made and after she had taken delivery of the goods in question.  She denied Plaintiff’s assertion that the overdraft had fallen into arrears and contended that the balance attributed to her was wrong and overstated.  
The following issues were set down for determination at the trial.  
a. Whether or not Defendant as at the 31st day of October, 2014 was indebted to the Plaintiff in the sum of One Hundred and Ninety-Three Thousand, Six Hundred and Sixty-Three Ghana Cedis, Twelve Pesewas (GH¢193,663.12).  
b. Whether or not debits to the Defendant’s account were authorized by the Defendant.  
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c. Whether or not the facility termed by the Plaintiff as an overdraft facility was in real terms a supplier’s credit.  
d. Whether or not Defendant is literate.  
At the trial, Plaintiff bank was represented by its head of recoveries, BEDFORD AKUFFO DUAH. His evidence was essentially in line with his pleadings. He tendered in evidence the following exhibits:  
 EXHIBIT A – THE FACILITY LETTER  
EXHIBIT B AND B1 - DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT  
EXHIBIT C - INDENTURE OF DEFENDANT’S PROPERTY SITUATE AT ABLEKUMA, ACCRA PROVIDED AS COLLATERAL SECURITY FOR THE FACILITY  
EXHIBITS D AND D1 - COPIES OF CHEQUES DATED THE 11TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2006 AND 10 SEPTEMBER, 2006 RESPECTIVELY.  
The witness under cross examination explained that the facility being an overdraft had no regular structured payment apart from the requirement that it had to be retired by on the 31st day of August 2007.  He denied that EXHIBITS D and D1 had been tampered with by officials of the Plaintiff bank and insisted that both cheques were issued by the Defendant. He described the amendments made to EXHIBIT D as “corrections” and not alterations.  He stated further that even though it was the generally accepted practice for a customer to countersign amendments or changes effected to a cheque issued by that customer, the customer could based on an  understanding reached with the Branch Manager of the bank, authorize the said manager to counter sign on her behalf. He alleged that EXHIBIT D was countersigned by the Branch Manager based on such an agreement reached between the Defendant and the said manager.  He vehemently denied that Defendant’s claim that she is illiterate and was emphatic that EXHIBITS D and D1 were duly authorized by Defendant. Contrary to the Defendant’s assertions, he maintained that the Plaintiff bank, was only under a duty to carry out the instructions of the customer, in this case, the Defendant, without having an obligation to ascertain the exact 
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purpose for which those payments were being made. Consequently, Plaintiff was in no position to know whether or not the goods for which payment was effected had been supplied to the Defendant or not.  
The Defendant, who testified that she had been a customer of Plaintiff bank for over Nine (9) years, admitted in her testimony that she indeed applied for and was granted an overdraft facility of Twenty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH¢20, 000.00) as evidenced by EXHIBIT A.  According to her, the facility was subsequently reviewed upwards to Thirty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH¢30,000.00). The fact of the upward review is  neither pleaded nor borne out by the evidence on record. In line with her pleadings she contended that, the Plaintiff bank only permitted utilization of the facility for the payment of her suppliers who the bank insisted, were supposed to be account holders of Plaintiff bank. By the course of dealing, she issued cheques directly to her suppliers upon taking delivery of goods, whereupon, the suppliers in turn presented the cheques at the Plaintiff bank for payment.  According to her, the facility was to be liquidated by deposits she made into her current account as and when she made sales.  She alleged that she had made such numerous deposits towards defraying the overdraft that, she was, until she received the demand notice from the Plaintiff, under the impression that she had fully paid off the facility.  Further investigations conducted with the assistance of her sons revealed that she had been debited with two transactions that she did not authorize. Under cross examination, Defendant admitted that she had no documentary proof that she was under any compulsion from the Plaintiff to only buy from certain designated suppliers. She however maintained that the payments allegedly made on her behalf by Plaintiff to the suppliers by name Lizeen and Joy Trace were without her knowledge or authorization as she had not been supplied with any goods by them.  
In the light of the matters in dispute I propose to deal first with issue (d) which is whether or not Defendant is literate. I consider the said issue fundamental to the resolution of the present suit in view of the established legal principle that a Party seeking to bind an illiterate to a document is under an obligation to show that the illiterate understood the meaning and effect of the document he or she is alleged to have signed.  The Defendant pleads in paragraph 3 of her Statement of Defence that she is illiterate. She laments that the terms of the facility were neither properly 
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explained to her by Plaintiff nor was she advised to seek legal Counsel before executing same. It is not clear to me from the pleadings, what detriment Defendant claims to have suffered as a result of this alleged failure on the part of the Plaintiff bank but it remains to be pointed out that apart from the bare assertion of Defendant that she is illiterate, there is no evidence before me to substantiate this allegation.  By the Defendant’s own evidence, her relationship with the bank preceded her application for the overdraft facility in question. There is no evidence before this Court, that the Defendant in her previous dealings with the Plaintiff bank had ever required the assistance of the Plaintiff or any other person in order to appreciate the meaning or effect of any document. Indeed, under cross-examination she stated that she went to the bank alone whenever she had to effect a transaction at the bank.  
One fact that Defendant does not deny is that she duly signed EXHIBIT A herself. She does not allege fraud or misrepresentation against the Plaintiff bank. Neither does she allege duress or undue influence.  Even though she avers she was never given a copy of the terms and conditions of the facility, she demonstrates her knowledge and understanding of her obligations under the facility in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of her witness statement. Her understanding of the nature of the facility is further evidenced by the voluntary handing over of the title documents covering her property at Ablekuma to the Plaintiff bank. Any claim therefore, by the Defendant that she did not understand the terms of the facility will therefore be of no avail to her since her conduct proves the contrary. In the case OF REIDORF  alias SAKER V REIDORF [1974] 2GLR 38, the Court held that the wife, an illiterate could not rely on her illiteracy to repudiate the documents she had voluntarily executed when there was proof that she was fully aware that the documents bore the joint names of herself and her husband.  See also the case of SWISS AFRICAN TRADING CO. V ARYEE (1961) GLR 185. On the basis of the foregoing, I reject the Defendant’s claims that she did not understand the terms of the facility due to her alleged illiteracy and find that she fully appreciated the meaning and effect of EXHIBIT A before duly executing same.  She is therefore bound by its terms.  
I now proceed to deal with issue (c) which is whether the facility termed an overdraft facility by Plaintiff is a supplier’s credit.  
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 In my candid opinion, put against the facts of this case I am unable to appreciate how this issue aids in the resolution of the issues at hand.  Put simply, my understanding of a supplier’s credit is where goods are supplied to a purchaser by a seller upon an agreement that payment for the said goods or services will be made at a future date. The fact that such an agreement can only exist between a purchaser and a seller is quite clear and needs no further elaboration. Under such a facility the bank only steps in, based on a loan agreement entered into with the purchaser, to effect payment to the seller on the purchaser’s behalf.  
The Defendant contends that the agreement reached with the Plaintiff bank was a supplier’s credit agreement, in that, Defendant was by the terms of the agreement required to apply proceeds of the facility solely towards the purchase of goods from specified suppliers, failing which, the Plaintiff bank will refuse to pay for the said purchases. I find that this allegation is not supported by any evidence on record. EXHIBIT A, the facility letter clearly spells out the purpose for which the facility was granted i.e. to support working capital. A careful examination of EXHIBIT A does not disclose that the facility set down the purchase of goods from specified suppliers as a condition precedent to the grant of the facility.  In any event, it is trite learning that extrinsic evidence will not be admitted to vary or contradict the terms of a written document.  See Sections 25 and 177 of the Evidence Act, Act 323.  I therefore do not think Defendant has succeeded in establishing that she was under the facility required to buy only from suppliers designated by the Plaintiff.  However, as stated earlier, I do not see the relevance of the said issue because I do not think that it in any way affects the obligations of the Parties under EXHIBIT A.  In the case of SARFO V GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK [1992] 2 GLR 8, LUTTERODT J (as she then was) referred with approval to the case of CUTHBET V ROBARTS, LUBBOCK &CO [1909] 2 CH 226, where Cozens–Hardy held that if a customer draws a cheque in excess of an amount standing to the credit of his current account, that amounted to an overdraft which is really a request for a loan. Quite clearly as stated in the case of BARCLAYS BANK V SAKARI, [1996-97] SCGLR 639, under a loan agreement. “The obligation of the bank was to advance the money...and that of the Defendant was to repay the loan together with interest if any”. The purpose for which the loan, in this case the overdraft facility, was taken, has absolutely no bearing on the obligations of the Parties under the facility, in my opinion.  
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I now proceed to determine issues (a) and (b) which I intend to deal with together since the said issues in my view are intertwined. The said issues are (a) whether the Defendant as at the 31st day October, 2014 was indebted to the Plaintiff in the sum of One Hundred and Ninety-Three Thousand, Six Hundred and Sixty-Three Ghana Cedis, Twelve Pesewas (GH¢193,663.12) and (b) whether or not the debits to the Defendant’s account were transactions authorized by the Defendant.  
The Plaintiff’s witness testified that the Defendant disputes two transactions on her account. He however insists that her account statement clearly shows that she authorized the said payments.  The two disputed cheques were tendered as EXHIBIT D AND D1.   
Now, I will state without mincing words that, I find the Defendant’s objection to being debited with the amount on EXHIBIT D completely valid and unanswerable. It is trite learning that in the business of banking, the signature of a drawer is an essential element of a cheque.  Under 63 of the Bills of Exchange Act, Act 55, where a bill of exchange is altered without the assent of the Party liable on the bill, the bill is avoided except against the Party who has personally made, authorized or assented to the alteration. It is quite patent on the face of EXHIBIT D that the original payee VICTORY LINE ENT has been cancelled out and substituted with another payee by name JOY TRACE. Curiously, and contrary to established banking practice, the said cancellation has been countersigned by someone other than the drawer of the cheque, the Defendant in this case.   
Under cross-examination, Plaintiffs representative stated that the said “correction” had been effected by the Branch Manager of Plaintiff.  Plaintiff’s witness’ relentless efforts at avoiding the use of the word “alteration” did not go unnoticed by this Court. The Black’s Law Dictionary [8TH edition] defines an alteration as follows: “An act done to an instrument, after its execution, whereby its meaning or language is changed especially the changing of the term of a negotiable instrument without the consent of all the Parties to it…. Material alterations void an instrument but immaterial ones do not…An alteration is material if it (1) changes the….liabilities or duties of any Party (as by adding or removing the name of a maker, drawer, 
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endorser, payee or cosurety). Against this definition, I am in no doubt at all that the change effected to EXHBIT D was nothing short of an alteration.   
It is also necessary to refer to the exchange that ensued between Counsel for the Defendant and the Plaintiff’s representative during cross-examination The following responses were given by the Plaintiff’s representative under cross- examination: Q. So the Branch Manager did the alteration on EXHIBIT D. A. My Lord, per the evidence on EXHIBIT D I will not call it an alteration. Q. So as a banker, what will you call it? A. My Lord per what I see it can be called a correction.  Because there is a signature signed beside the cancelled name.     
Q. How many years have you worked as a banker? A. My Lord, 11years. Q. So with 11 years’ experience as a banker tell this Court what happens when a customer issues a cheque and there is a need to amend or change something on it. What is the procedure?  
A. I will put it from two angles.  One is the customer would bring a new cheque to replace the existing one or based on the relationship between the Branch Manager and the customer, a telephone conversation can be done and the result would come forth as it seemed in EXHIBIT D.        
Q. So the customer is never made to countersign and amend.      
A. My Lord, it also depends on the relationship between the Branch Manager and the customer but technically there should be a countersign.  
Q: I am putting it to you that that is the standard procedure that there should be a countersign by the customer.  
A. My Lord, I don’t admit that totally.  
Q. And that, in the case of EXHIBIT D, the Defendant did not do such countersign.  
A. My Lord, yes, on the face of EXHIBIT D, the Defendant did not countersign.        
Q. So that could not have been her authorization.  
A. My Lord, it could have been her authorization per telephone conversation.  
Q. I further put it to you that there was no such telephone conversation between the Defendant and your manager.  
A. My Lord, I cannot confirm that, since the Branch Manager is not at post.  
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Q. But whatever telephone conversation you had in your bank are recorded.  
A. My Lord, once there is a telephone conversation and agreement is reached, the manager goes ahead and does what the customer has said.  
Q. You have not answered my question.  
A. My Lord, what I am trying to say is those conversations are not fully recorded on the cheque or any paper as you are saying.  
Q. So you mean you cannot trace any evidence of such conversation.  
A. My Lord, yes, we cannot trace it.                  
The pith of the Plaintiff’s case as regards EXHIBIT D, is that the alteration to the said exhibit was effected on the instruction of Defendant. This claim has been stoutly denied by the Defendant. The general principle of the law is that he who asserts must prove. In the light of Defendant’s denial, the onus fell on the Plaintiff to prove that the alteration effected to EXHIBIT D was done upon the authorization of the Defendant.   
In the case of OKUDZETO ABLAKWA & ANOR [2012] 2 SCGLR 845, the Court held at PAGE 867 as follows: “…If a Party goes to Court, to make an allegation, the onus is on him to lead evidence to prove that allegation, unless the allegation is admitted.  If he fails to do that, the ruling on that allegation will go against him.  Stated more explicitly, a party cannot win a case in Court if the case is based on an allegation which he fails to prove or establish”.  
See also SECTIONS 14 AND 17 of the Evidence Act, Act 323. Unfortunately, Plaintiff’s representative dismally failed to lead any evidence in proof of his allegation that the Defendant authorized the alteration and consequent payment of the amount specified in EXHIBIT D to Joy Trace.  The Defendant therefore cannot be held liable on EXHIBIT D and I so hold.   
The next issue that faces this Court relates to EXHIBIT D1. The Defendant in similar vein, denies ever issuing EXHIBIT D1.  The grounds upon which she challenges the validity of EXHIBIT D1 is firstly, that she never authorized the said payment as she  had no  business transaction with Lizeen, the payee on that cheque.  Secondly she contends that the said Lizeen never received the said amount for which she was debited.  On the evidence, the Defendant appears to be levelling a charge of forgery 
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against the Plaintiff bank.  To buttress her stance, she relies on the simplicity of her signature which she claims renders it susceptible to forgery.  It is noted that, apart from EXHIBIT D1, Defendant does not dispute the authenticity of her signatures on any of the other exhibits tendered in this Court.  Fortified by authorities such as FENUKU V JOHN TEYE [2001-2002] SCGLR 985 and STATE V LAWMAN [1961] GLR (Pt II) 689, I have taken the time to carefully examine and compare Defendant’s signature in EXHIBIT D1 with her signatures in EXHIBITS D and A, and I must say that I find a striking similarity between the disputed and the accepted signatures. Given this fact, I am unable to see how even the Plaintiff bank could have detected that Defendant’s signature had been forged, assuming without admitting that her allegations are true.  In accordance with sound banking practice, a cheque that has been duly signed by the drawer is sufficient authority to the drawee bank to pay  the amount specified thereon to the payee of the cheque and I am satisfied that this is exactly what the Plaintiff bank did in this case.  The standard of care expected of the Plaintiff is one of an ordinary prudent banker and not that of a detective. It follows therefore that Defendant will be presumed to have duly issued EXHIBIT D1 and will be held liable on same unless she leads credible and cogent evidence in rebuttal of the said presumption. SEE Section 20 Of Evidence Act, NRCD 323.   
During cross examination, Defendant was asked: Q:  You have just said you were granted an overdraft facility. A:  That is correct. Q: And it is also correct that every payment on your account was by a cheque signed by you. A:  That is correct. Q:  Where do you usually sign these cheques. A:  I work with five people so when it is time to make payments I take the cheque to the bank and sign them  Q:  So I am correct that the cheque book is always in your possession. A:  That is correct.  
During his cross-examination of the Plaintiff’s representative, Counsel for Defendant alluded to the fact that EXHIBIT D1 was the “handiwork” of the officials of Plaintiff bank.  Put another way, Counsel sought to suggest that the said Exhibit had been 
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forged by the Branch Manager of the Plaintiff bank.  It is trite learning that under Section 13 Of Evidence Act, NRCD 323 any allegation of forgery or fraud will have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. SEE THE CASE OF SUSU BAMFO V SINTIM [2012] 1 SCGLR 136.  Having admitted that the cheque book was always in her possession, the Defendant appears to have lost sight of the burden thrust on her to produce evidence in explanation of how a leaflet from the said cheque book which was always under her care and custody ended up in the hands of Plaintiff’s Branch Manager or anyone else for that matter. This, she failed to do. I am also not persuaded by Counsel for Defendant’s contention that the writing of the name Kofi without more, instead of what he termed a “signature” amounted to an irregularity and evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff bank’s officials. It is worth pointing out that the Bills of Exchange Act, ACT 55 does not define the term “signature”.  The Black’s Law Dictionary [8th edition] however defines a signature as “a person’s name or mark written by that person or at that person’s direction”.  It further defines a signature in Commercial Law as “any name mark or writing, used with the intention of authenticating a document.”  In the light of this definition, a signature does not necessarily mean writing a person’s full name, first name or surname. In my thinking, even the initials of a person alone may be sufficient.  I therefore cannot share the view of Counsel that the absence of a “signature” on the pay-slip in EXHIBIT D1 throws doubt on the authenticity or validity of EXHIBIT D1.  I should also add for good measure, that the fact that Lizeen is alleged never to have received payment on EXHIBIT D1 does not in any way substantiate Defendants claim that she did not issue EXHIBIT D1.  In any event, Lizeen was never brought to confirm or deny Defendant’s assertion.  EXHIBIT B1 confirms that payment was duly effected on 10/8/2006 to LIZEEN in line with EXHIBIT D1.  I accordingly, make a finding of fact that Defendant issued EXHIBIT D1 and is therefore liable on it.  
This brings me to the final issue which is whether the Plaintiff was indebted to the Defendant in the sum of One hundred and Ninety Three thousand, Six Hundred and Sixty Three Ghana Cedis, Twelve Pesewas (GH 193,663.12) as at 31st October, 2014. Before proceeding to determine the said issue, I will like to comment on how the evidence on record demonstrates a lack of candour on the part of the Defendant. In paragraph 7 of the Defendants witness statement filed on the 29th February 2016, she testifies that the service of the demand notice of the amount outstanding on her 
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account left her confused since she was under the impression that she had fully defrayed the debt owed on the facility.  On the 9th of May 2016, however, she stated under cross-examination as follows:  
“Initially I thought I owed the bank but when I went for the statement I realized I do not owe them because Thirty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH¢30, 000.00) had been made to LIZEEN and Thirty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH¢30, 000.00) to JOYCELYN which made me realize I do not owe the bank.”  
The Defendant clearly appears to be speaking from both sides of her mouth. In one breath she claims that she believed she had fully paid off the facility due to the “numerous sales deposits” she had made into her account.  In the same breath, she alleges that she thought she owed until she discovered that she had been wrongly debited with payments she did not authorize.  I do not believe the Defendant when she says that the bank took no steps to recover the debt from her. But even if they did not, did it not behove her, as an honest and diligent customer who had voluntarily applied for and obtained the facility, to take steps to pay off the debt she owed the Plaintiff?  The fact that Defendant did not even take steps to recover her title documents deposited with Plaintiff as collateral leads me to infer that she knew and understood that she still had not discharged her obligations under EXHIBIT A to the Plaintiff  What remains now to be determined is the question of how much is owed by the Defendant to Plaintiff bank.  By my examination of EXHIBITS B and B1, it appears to me that Counsel for the Defendant has taken a very simple view of the matter by concluding that the amount allegedly owed by Defendant is the total sum of EXHIBITS D and D1 put together with interest thereon.  As Plaintiff’s representative rightly pointed out, the facility being an overdraft does not enable one to specify particular transactions as constituting the debt until the expiry of the facility when a debit on the account will show the amount owed by the customer. Thus, it cannot be said with any certainty that the amount outstanding is Sixty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH¢60, 000.) together with interest thereon.   
In the result, for the reasons advanced in this judgement, I enter judgement for the Plaintiff in respect of relief (a) less the sum of Thirty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH¢30, 000.00) being the amount paid to Joy Trace which was wrongfully debited to Defendants account by the Plaintiff, together with any interest worked thereon.  
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The Parties are to compute the amount payable by the Defendant after the said deduction with the assistance of the Director of Finance of the Judicial Service.  
b) Interest is to be paid on the said amount at the agreed interest rate of 26.5% per annum from the 16th day of September, 2014 until date of final payment.  
c) Failing this and in the alternative, I order the judicial sale of Defendant’s Property situate at Ablekuma, Accra which is more particularly described in the Statement of Claim and used as collateral security for the facility granted Defendant.  
In view of evidence of a failure on the part of the Plaintiff bank to exercise reasonable care and skill in the discharge of its duties to the Defendant, I award Plaintiff nominal costs of Five Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH¢5000.00).   
          (SGD) MRS. AKUA SARPOMAA AMOAH    JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT   
       