JUDGEMENT  
The Plaintiff herein was until the 11th day of December 2006, in the employment of Defendant Company as a Chief Clerk stationed at Kumasi.  In the month of October that same year, a three Member Committee was constituted by the Defendant Company to investigate allegations of diversion of direct businesses at the Kumasi area office.  At the end of the preliminary investigations by the three-member committee, an interim report was submitted by the said committee to a five Member Disciplinary Committee, charged with the conduct of hearings involving persons suspected to have been involved in the said malpractice.  Plaintiff happened to be one of the persons implicated in the said report.  After appearing before the said Committee for interrogation, Plaintiff was by a letter dated the 11th day of December, 2006 summarily dismissed from the employment of the Defendant on grounds of gross misconduct.  Plaintiff avers in her Amended Statement of Claim filed on the 9th 
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day of March, 2015, that upon receipt of her dismissal letter, she followed up to the head office of the Defendant Company where she was handed a copy of the final report of the Committee.  According to her, the said report revealed that her dismissal was based on some allegations leveled against her by one Afari Bediako who she was neither given the opportunity to meet nor cross-examine at the Committee hearing.  Plaintiff thus petitioned Defendant against her dismissal but the Defendant Company wrote back affirming its decision.  
In the event, Plaintiff filed the present writ on the 5th day of July, 2012, claiming the following against the Defendant: a) A declaration that the dismissal of Plaintiff by the Defendant on the 11th of December 2006 is wrongful. b) Salaries and allowances due Plaintiff from December 2006 to date of judgement with interest thereon. c) Damages for wrongful dismissal. e) Costs.  
The Defendant on the other hand, vehemently denies that Plaintiff is entitled to the said reliefs.  By its Statement of Defence filed on the 26th of July 2012, the Defendant denies that the committee was in breach of its stipulated methodology in hearing the Plaintiff and maintains that the Plaintiff was given every opportunity to be heard by the Disciplinary Committee duly constituted, before its arrival at the decision to dismiss her summarily for gross misconduct and abuse of office.  
At the close of pleadings, issues filed by both Parties were settled for determination at the trial.  Some of the said issues are clearly intertwined and therefore do not require being dealt with separately.  In my opinion the issues relevant for the resolution of this matter are as follows:  
1) Whether or not the Plaintiff’s dismissal was in breach of the Disciplinary Committee’s method of hearing and investigating staff. 2) Whether the plaintiff was dismissed on grounds of proven misconduct, 3) Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs endorsed on the writ of   summons and statement of claim, 4) Any other issues raised by the pleadings.  
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I propose to deal with issues 1 and 2 together since to my mind the two are intertwined. The first and I believe the most fundamental issue that calls for resolution in this suit is, whether or not the hearing and investigation of the charges leveled against Plaintiff, were in breach of the Disciplinary Committee’s stated methodology thereby rendering her summary dismissal wrongful.  Before proceeding to determine the said issue however, I consider it necessary at this point, to summarize the oral testimony of Plaintiff.  In her testimony before this Court, Plaintiff stated that she was engaged by the Defendant Company, formally known as the State Insurance Corporation in 1982 as a junior typist. By dint of hard work, examinations and promotions, she rose to the position of Chief Clerk.  Plaintiff tendered without objection, Exhibits C, C1 and C2, being assessment advice as evidence of this fact. According to her, as Chief Clerk her job entailed doing normal clerical work, underwriting policies and receiving customers. She added that she also doubled as a staff agent when in 1990, management of Defendant Company introduced the staff agency policy to enable the Defendant Company get more business.  As a staff agent she brought to the Defendant Company, businesses from big companies such as Kinapharma.  This staff agency policy was however abolished in the year 2004. Plaintiff prided herself on having worked for 24 years without query or suspension. To press home this point, she tendered in evidence Exhibit D, a certificate of merit awarded her for being the best performer in the Kumasi office.  In the year 2006 however, she was summarily dismissed by a letter, tendered without objection as Exhibit B, on a charge of diversion of direct business.  It is the thrust of Plaintiff’s case that the Defendant Company, in breach of its laid down methodology for the conduct of the said hearing failed to afford her the opportunity to meet, confront or to challenge the evidence of one Afari Bediako, the one upon whose allegations, the Defendant based her dismissal. She stressed that it was only after she was given a copy of the Committee’s report, which she tendered as Exhibit E, that she discovered the true basis for her dismissal.  The Defendant does not deny Plaintiff’s allegation that she was never allowed to confront or cross examine her accuser but maintains that by Clause 3(iv) of Exhibit E, no controversy had arisen to warrant a crossexamination of the said Afari Bediako by the Plaintiff.  To further buttress this stance, it is urged on this Court by the Defendant, that once the Plaintiff admitted to introducing the agent Afari bediako to the client, that amounted to an admission of the 
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charge of having diverted direct business and therefore there was no need to call the said Afari Bediako to be cross examined by the Plaintiff.   
It was held in the case of BANK FOR WEST AFRICA LTD V ACKUN (1963)1 GLR @ 176-182 that the onus of proof in civil cases depends upon the pleadings. The Party who in his or her pleadings raises an issue essential to the success of their case assumes the burden of proof.  Proof in civil cases is by a preponderance of probabilities; which means the obligation of a Party to establish a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the Court and the burden of persuasion may require a Party to establish the existence or non-existence of a fact by a preponderance of probabilities (See ODAMETEY V CLOCUH (198990)1GLR14 AND SECTION10 OF NRCD 323).  Unless and until it is shifted, a Party has the burden of persuasion as to each fact, the existence or non-existence of which is essential to a claim or defence that Party is asserting. The onus is thus on the Plaintiff to prove her claim.  
Plaintiff contends, that after she had been duly informed of who her accusers were, she requested an opportunity to meet and to cross examine both persons but the Committee only called one of them for questioning by the Plaintiff and failed or refused to call the other.  This failure notwithstanding, it was the evidence of the witness that Plaintiff was not permitted to confront or to cross-examine that the Committee based its findings on, to summarily dismiss her.  Exhibit E is headed “FINAL REPORT OF COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE DIVERSION OF DIRECT BUSINESS IN KUMASI AREA OFFICE”.  
On page 1 of the said Exhibit, it is explained in Paragraph 3 that the same is a report of a five-man Disciplinary Committee set up by the Deputy Managing Director, (F&A), following the presentation of an initial report by a three-man investigative team.  This Court was not given the benefit of sighting the interim report of this threeman investigative team. In any event, the five–man Committee, though named a Disciplinary Committee, was by the heading of Exhibit E an investigative body.  
Now, it is well settled, that Committees of Inquiry, like the present one set up by the Defendant Company are “masters” of their own procedure and need not follow strict formal procedure “akin to Court room proceedings” see THE CASE OF REPUBLIC 
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V GHANA RAILWAY CORPORATION (1981) GLR 752, this principle however, as I understand it, is subject to the overriding requirement for procedural fairness. As fact finding bodies, their functions are judicial in character and indeed In the English case of IN RE PERGAMON PRESS(1970) 3 AER  535 @ 539, LORD DENNING MR  in  reference  to  such committees  had this to  say “They may, if they think  fit , make findings of fact which are very damaging to those whom they name, they may accuse some, they may condemn others, they may ruin reputations or careers, their report may lead to  judicial proceedings, it may expose persons to criminal prosecutions or to civil actions.” The law therefore, demands the strict observance by such Committees of the basic rules of natural justice. The rules of natural justice require that a Party be given a full and fair hearing. This involves giving a Party adequate notice of the case they have to meet and a genuine opportunity to state their case and to controvert allegations made against them if need be. I am supported in this reasoning by Court of Appeal decision in the case of DARKWA V THE REPUBLIC (1981) 241.  
It is quite evident from exhibit E that the committee set up by the Defendant Company, was fully aware of their duty to observe the rules of natural justice in their quest to ascertain the truth.   This fact is borne out by Clause 2 Sub clause 2 as well as clauses 3(iii) and 3(iv) respectively of Exhibit E. Clause 2, which spells out the terms of reference of the said Committee states in Sub clause 2 as follows:   
“To conduct hearings and to determine the level of involvement of the persons named in the document and any others whose names will appear in the cause of the disciplinary hearing…”  
Sub clauses (iii) and (iv) respectively of Clause 3 headed methodology also stipulate:  “iii. Those who have been implicated in the report were given the opportunity to determine their culpability or otherwise by giving them a hearing. iv. Wherever any controversy or issue arises, individuals involved are made to cross examine each other in order to determine the truth or otherwise of the allegations.”   
Clearly, the bounden duty imposed on any fact-finding body to ascertain the truth of an allegation, before making a finding was not lost on this committee. The crucial 
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question to ask at this stage, is therefore, whether a controversy arose within the meaning of paragraph 3(iv) as regards the charges leveled against the Plaintiff.  The Committees proceedings relating to the Plaintiff can be found on pages 7, 22, 24 and 34 of Exhibit E. The report states on page 7 as follows:  
“She also has two cases of diverted business which she did not submit for pardon. When the agent involved on the KAT $ CO policy, Mr Afari Bediako was interviewed, it became clear that Miss Mercy Anim has placed his name on the business as agent. The agent stated emphatically that he is just being used as a conduit. He only collects commission and gives it to Mercy who gives him only part of  it…”.  
On page 22 the report states further”She claimed her brother formerly of Provident Insurance Company but now at Unique Insurance introduced the client to her and that the client indicated that since he was a very busy person, he needed an agent to be servicing his business. She admitted that she introduced Afari Bediako as agent to the client”.   The report again states on page 34 under the caption AFARI YEBOAH ON KAT $ Co. that  ‘He submitted that Mercy informed him that KAT & Co was her major client so she intends passing over the business to SIC and to use him as an agent. She therefore introduced the man to him as an agent. However when the commission was received, he handed all the money to Mercy who gave him some. He confirmed that Mercy took him to the man for him to be appointed as agent”.  I must say, that I am fully aware that there is a wealth of legal authority in support of the proposition that failure to allow a person to confront or to cross-examine his or her accuser in an administrative inquiry may not necessarily amount to a breach of the rules of natural justice. I however note, that in all such cases, including the revolutionary case of CEYLON UNIVERSITY V FERNANDO 1WLR 223, where a hearing was held to be fair though witnesses were heard in the absence  of the Defendant, the Defendants were duly  given adequate information on the charges leveled against them.  Counsel for Defendant relies on the Supreme Court case of LAGUDA V GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK to buttress his point that failure to allow Plaintiff to cross-examine Afari Bediako did not necessarily amount to a breach of the Audi alterem patem rule.  What Counsel however failed to advert his mind to, 
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is the Court’s holding that “a core idea implicit in the natural justice principle of audi alterem patem was simply that a party ought to have reasonable notice of the case he has to meet and ought to be given the opportunity to make his statement in explanation of any question and answer any arguments put forward against it”.  It seems clear from the above reasoning that a Party is entitled to being furnished adequate information on the charges leveled against him or her to enable the said Party state their case fully either in acceptance or rebuttal of the said allegations. In her testimony in this Court on the 25th day of February, 2015, Plaintiff stated as follows: “I was given the chance to cross examine Eva Opoku but as for Afari Bediako, the Committee said I am earning illegal commission which I said no”. What was the nature of these illegal commissions and how was Plaintiff earning these?  In ascertaining what actually transpired at the hearing, this Court must look no further than to the contents of Exhibit E.  I have taken time to carefully examine Exhibit E and do not find anywhere in the said Exhibit that, the Plaintiff was made fully aware of the allegations of Afari Bediako.  Specifically, his claims of having been appointed and used as a conduit by Plaintiff, as a result of which he always handed over Commissions paid to him by the Defendant, to her for sharing. I am unable to tell how or why the Commission came to the foregone conclusion that Afari Bediako”s allegations were true.   
A paraphrased transcript of the hearing granted the Plaintiff can be found on page 22 of exhibit E.  In my view, a verbatim transcription of the said proceedings would have been more helpful to this Court in ascertaining what actually transpired at the hearing. In any event, it is quite evident from the said record that Plaintiff was never afforded the opportunity to contradict or explain the grave charges leveled against her by the said witness. The Defendant vehemently denies Plaintiff’s claims that she requested the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, but even assuming that, this was actually the case, did the said failure on the part of the Plaintiff relieve the Committee of its duty to do what was fair and reasonable in the circumstances? Did it not behove the Committee, to ensure that these allegations were substantiated in line with the rules of natural justice as well as its own terms of reference and laid down methodology?  Why did the Committee deem it necessary to call in Plaintiff to “confirm” allegations made by one Eva Opoku? (see page 24) but not Afari Bediako? Did the Plaintiff ever admit to being guilty of the charges leveled by Afari Bediako?  
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In the case of DARKWA V THE REPUBLIC (SUPRA), the Court stressed the need for Committees of Inquiry to take every reasonable step to ascertain the truth before arriving at findings that could result in “prosecution in Court, dismissal, retirement removal or reduction in rank”. The Defendant contends that there was no need to ascertain the veracity of Afari Bediako’s allegations, Plaintiff having admitted to introducing him to the client, KAT & Co but the question is, could the mere admission by Plaintiff that she introduced Afari Bediako to KAT & Co upon request resolve the entire controversy surrounding  allegations that his appointment was a sham, something the client KAT & Co knew nothing about or more importantly, the allegation that  the Plaintiff was the ultimate beneficiary of Commissions paid by the Defendant Company to the said agent?  I think not!   
In my opinion, a real controversy had arisen, which made it imperative for Plaintiff to be afforded the opportunity to confront her accuser, the better to draw the Committee’s attention to the strengths in her case and the weaknesses in that of her accuser if any. This, needless to say, the Committee was required to do in line with Clauses 3(iii) and (iv) of its laid down methodology.   
In the absence of any evidence before this Court that Defendant complied with the above requirements, I find that the Disciplinary Committee set up by the Defendant Company failed to follow its stipulated methodology in the investigation of charges leveled against the Plaintiff.  
I now turn to the issue of whether Plaintiff was dismissed on grounds of proven misconduct.  By a letter dated the 11th of December 2006, tendered by the Plaintiff as Exhibit B, the Plaintiff was informed of her summary dismissal from the services of Defendant Company, on grounds of gross misconduct. As stated in, the said Exhibit, this decision by the Defendant was based on the findings of the Committee set up to investigate Plaintiffs alleged involvement in the diversion of direct business.  I therefore consider it necessary in resolving this issue, to ascertain what exactly amounts to diversion of direct business by an employee in insurance practice.   
Counsel for Defendant in his address filed on the 19th day of February 2016, stated as follows, “Diversion of direct business entailed the employee, without the authorization or consent of the client, contriving with certain persons to place their names on the clients transaction file as though such persons were appointed 
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“agent” of the client…….in essence the client is unaware of the transaction since he did not appoint the agent.”   
On page 22 of Exhibit E, the Committee, in reference to the Plaintiff’s evidence stated as follows: “She claimed that her brother formerly of Provident Insurance Company introduced the client to her and that the client indicated to her that he was a very busy person and needed an agent to be servicing his businesses. She admitted she introduced Afari Bediako as agent to the client.”  It appears to me, that the Defendant makes heavy weather of the said admission by Plaintiff as evidence of misconduct on her part..  Indeed, the Defendant’s witness had this to say under crossexamination:  
Q: Why did you not make any enquiries from KAT & Co?  
A:  We did not because no controversy had arisen. The Plaintiff told the Committee she led the agent to the client and the agent admitted she led the agent to the client.  
Now, the Plaintiff’s case as I understand it, is that she introduced the said Afari Bediako to the client upon request. This, to my mind and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, cannot amount to an admission by the Plaintiff of having diverted direct business within the definition of the said offence given by the Defendant.  Additionally, there is no evidence before this Court that suggests even remotely, that merely introducing an agent to a client, upon the request of that client for an agent, amounts to diversion of direct business.  Infact, this Court notes from page 23 of Exhibit E that the Committee found that the agent for Kinapharma had also been appointed by the said company on the recommendation of Plaintiff. Why then, did the Committee not find the charge of diversion of direct business proven in that case?  I actually note a basic contradiction in the case of the Defendant.  In one breath, the Committee, found on page 7 of Exhibit E, that the Plaintiff was responsible for placing the agent’s name on the client’s business (obviously without the clients knowledge or consent}, then, in the same breath, it confirmed on page 22 and more particularly, on page 34 of the same Exhibit that “Mercy took him to the man for him to be appointed as agent”.  If the Committee found for a fact that, Plaintiff introduced the agent to the client, after which he was appointed as agent by 
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the client, how can it then be reasonably argued that it was Plaintiff who placed the name of the agent on the client’s books without the client’s knowledge?  Flowing from the above, I am not impressed by the Defendant’s belated attempt to question the authenticity of Exhibit H, the letter, said to have been written by the Managing Director of KAT & Co. Defendant’s witness stated as follows under cross-examination; Q: KAT and Co wrote a letter to the Defendant. A: Yes. Q: When was Exhibit H written? A: 20th February, 2004 Q: Did the Defendant work on this letter A: Yes.  
The witness also states in his evidence- in- chief as follows: “When Afari Bediako was invited he indicated to us that they had no knowledge about that business in question and that the Plaintiff led him to see the proprietor of Kat and Co for him the agent to be made an agent for Kat and Co and a letter was given to that effect”.  By the Defendants own showing, Exhibit H was not only written by the client but  was also accepted and worked on by the Defendant though it bore no letter head and pre-dated the abolishing of the staff agency policy. I am therefore not attracted to the Defendant’s present claim that the said exhibit is of doubtful validity.   
It is the case of the Defendant that Plaintiff was summarily dismissed in accordance with Sections 5(6) and 5(7) of Exhibit 1, the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into between the Defendant and the Union of Industry, Commerce and Finance Workers (UNICOF).   
 In the case of OPARE YEBOAH V BARCLAYS BANK GHANA LTD 2011 1SCGLR 330, the Supreme Court at page 348, affirmed the time honored proposition that procedures outlined in contracts of employment, such as the Collective Bargaining Agreement must be followed to give a summary dismissal validity.  
Section 5(6) OF Exhibit 1, headed SUMMARY DISMISSAL states as follows: The company reserves the right to dismiss any employee for proven gross misconduct.   
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Clearly the operative word here is proven.  The onus thus lay on the Defendant to prove that the alleged misconduct was proven before it arrived at a decision to summarily dismiss Plaintiff.  Under the said section, for an employee to suffer the ultimate sanction of summary dismissal, guilt will have to be proved or established. In order to establish guilt, an employee ought to “be permitted to challenge the very allegations made against him (or her in this case) and to have had the right to call evidence in support of his (or her) contentions”. SEE DARKWA V THE REPUBLIC (SUPRA). This, to my mind, will only be possible if the said employee is granted the opportunity to be heard fully.    
In view of the Court’s thinking, which I believe, has been adequately expressed earlier on in this judgment, I do not deem it necessary to reiterate the reasons why I do not find the charges leveled against the Plaintiff proven.  
 I do agree with Counsel for the Defendant that Exhibit 2, a query served on Plaintiff, clearly impinges on her credibility, given her claims that she served the Defendants for 24 years without blemish.  This fact, however does not, in any way detract from the legal duty imposed on the Defendant to have ensured that Plaintiff’s guilt was established before she was condemned. I must say that the presence of the Union Members at the Committee sitting did not necessarily guarantee a fair hearing or prove that Plaintiff was afforded one.  
I accordingly, find that the procedure stipulated in Exhibit 1 was not complied by the Defendant in Plaintiff’s case. The summary dismissal of Plaintiff on grounds of proven misconduct therefore cannot stand and I declare the same wrongful. Having declared the Plaintiff’s dismissal wrongful as prayed for in relief (a) of her writ, I proceed to deal with reliefs (b) and (c).  Plaintiff prays for an order for the payment of all salaries and allowances due her from December 2006 to date of judgment with interest thereon. The rationale behind this prayer appears to me to be, that, if the dismissal was wrongful, then the Plaintiff was in law, never dismissed and remained an employee of the Defendant for which reason she is entitled to all salaries and other allowances due her up to date. This, to my mind is tantamount to asking for payment of salary arrears with other entitlements in lieu of reinstatement. It however remains the common law that, the  remedy available to an employee who has been wrongfully dismissed or terminated is an action for damages, unless of course, there is a public 
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law element which requires otherwise.  It was held in the case of ASHUN V ACCRA BREWERY LTD [2009] SCGLR 81 that “the principle, in the absence of any contrary statutory or contractual provision, the measure of damages for wrongful termination of employment… was compensation based on the employee’s current salary and conditions of service for a reasonable period within which the aggrieved party was expected to find alternative employment…the measure of damages was the quantum of what the aggrieved party would have earned from his employment during such reasonable period, determinable by the court after which such employee should have found alternative employment. The quantum was subject to the mitigation of damages’’.   
Though no evidence was led by the Parties in this regard, It is well settled that the position of the Ghanaian Courts is that a dismissed employee is expected to have found alternative employment within 2 years of such dismissal SEE THE SUPREME COURT CASE OF NARTEY TOKOLI V VOLTA ALUMINIUM COLTD (NO. 2), 89-90  2 GLR  341.  I therefore order that Plaintiff be paid a sum equal to her total salary for 18 months plus all other benefits and allowances due her as at 11th December, 2006. I also award costs of GH¢10,000 in favour of Plaintiff.  In conclusion, judgement is entered in favour of Plaintiff as follows: i. It is hereby declared that the summary dismissal of Plaintiff by a letter dated the 11th   of December 2006 was wrongful. ii. Plaintiff is awarded 18 months’ salary as damages for wrongful dismissal iii. Interest on the said sum awarded as damages from date of judgment till date of final payment iv. Costs of 10,000 awarded in favour of Plaintiff against the Defendant.    
         [SGD]  MRS. AKUA SARPOMAA AMOAH    JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT aey/    