RULING 
This is an application to confiscate Plot No. 2A Mango close, Dansoman, Accra, property of the respondent herein to the state, in accordance with Sections 46, 47, 48, 49 & 51 of the Economic and Organised Crime Office Act, 2010, (Act 804), which is opposed to by the respondents’ lawful attorney and the claimant herein.  The facts of this case are that, somewhere in 2011, the applicant was arrested by the security agencies for being a manager of a Ghana-based heroin trafficking organization response for illegally importing into the United States of America multiple kilograms of heroin. Subsequently, the respondent with some of his ring leaders were extradited to the United States of America to stand trial. On 6th April, 
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2012, the respondent pleaded guilty to conspiracy to import heroin and was convicted and sentenced to one hundred and sixty-eight (168) months imprisonment by United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, in Case Number 1:11 CR 00199—001 pursuant to 21 U.S. Code § 963. The respondent is currently serving his sentence at the Federal Correctional Institution at Fort Dix, New Jersey, U.S.A., and has given a power of attorney to his oldest son, Edward Macauley Jnr. of House No. 11 24th Close, Dansoman, to pursue this suit on his behalf. Following the conviction of the respondent for illicit dealing in drugs, the 2nd applicant identified the above stated property, Plot No. 2A Mango close, Dansoman, Accra, as belonging to the respondent and therefore liable to be confiscated to the state.  The case of the applicants is that the respondent had been on the wanted list of the 2nd applicant and his activities had been monitored since 2002 as a drug dealer. The respondent, with the assistance of some accomplices at the Ghana Airport Company used couriers aboard commercial airlines to smuggle heroin from Ghana to the United States. The respondent also used his house as a meeting place of drug couriers in order to facilitate or aid his drug trafficking activities. It is the case of the applicants that having been convicted of conspiracy to import heroin into the United States, which is also a serious offence under the law, the properties of the respondent are liable to be confiscated to the state so as to deprive the respondent of benefiting from his crime and also as part of his punishment for dealing in drugs. The applicants contend that the properties of the respondent are presumed to be acquired from the respondent’s drug dealing unless the respondent rebuts the assumption with cogent evidence to the contrary. The applicants further contend that the respondent who has the burden of proving that the property attached is not tainted, illegal or acquired through illegitimate means has woefully failed to do so. The applicants, therefore, pray the court for confiscating order in respect of the attached property.  The case of the respondent, in an affidavit of opposition filed by the respondent on 18th August, 2015, is that the attached property is not a derivative of illicit drug trafficking and that it was neither used to facilitate or aid the commission of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs. The respondent asserted that Plot No. 2A Mango Close, Dansoman, and the building on it belong to his son who is also called Edward Macauley, his attorney in the instant case, and that the signature of the respondent and that of his son, the attorney which is on the indenture, are quite clear and distinct.  
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Learned counsel for the 2nd applicant submitted that one of the purposes of the Narcotic Drugs (Control, Enforcement and Sanctions) Law, 1990 (PNDCL 236), as stated in its preamble, is to “put in place provisions that will prevent illicit narcotic drug dealers benefitting from their crimes”. He stated that Sections 15(1) (a) of PNDCL 236 specifies the person liable to be proceeded against for the confiscation of properties as follows:  “Section 15 – Persons Liable to be Proceeed Against.  (1) Any person who –  a) has been convicted of an offence under Part 1 or Part 11 of this Law or of a corresponding offence under a foreign law committed after the commencement of this Law;” Learned counsel for the 2nd applicant submitted that the respondent was convicted of conspiracy to import heroin into the United States of America under the 21 U.S. Code § 963 which is a corresponding offence under Section 56 of the PNDCL 236. He contended that the respondent is therefore a liable person whose properties are liable to be confiscated to the state. He added that under Section 46 of the Economic and Organised Crime Office Act, 2010, (Act 804), having been convicted of a serious offence, the respondent’s properties are liable to be seized and confiscated to the State and the Executive Director of E.O.C.O. can apply to the court for a confiscation order against the property that is deemed to be tainted property.  Section 46 of Act 804 states as follows: “46. (1) Where a person is on trial for a serious offence, the Executive Director shall apply to the Court for either or both of the following orders (a) a confiscation order against property that is deemed to be tainted property, or  (b) a pecuniary penalty order against the person in respect of benefit derived by that person from the serious offence.   
(2) Where a person is convicted of a serious offence, the Executive Director shall apply to the Court within one month after the conviction, for any of the orders specified under subsection (1).” Learned counsel for the 2nd applicant submitted that pursuant to the above provisions, by the reason of the respondent’s conviction, the properties belonging to the respondent are all illegal or tainted properties liable to be confiscated to the state.  
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He emphasized that the confiscation proceedings are part of the sentencing process following a conviction and it is utilized to enhance the punishment of a defendant who has already been convicted of a particular offence. He cited the case of The Executive Director, Economic and Organised Crime Office vrs. Ibrahim Sima, unreported, a ruling delivered on 09/12/11 by the High Court, where after quoting Sections 22 and 46 of Act 804, and Order 19 of C.I. 47, and also the cases of McIntosh v. Lord Advocate (2001) 3 WLR 107 and Philips v. United Kingdom (Application 41087/98) 5 July [2001] Crim. L. R. 817, came to the conclusion that:  “At the risk of sounding repetitive, I hold in this Ruling that the application for a confiscation order is not a new criminal charge since the respondent has already been convicted for the qualifying offence, i.e. dealing in illicit drug trafficking. Rather, the application is part of the sentencing process after the confiscation …”  He also cited United States of America v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658 (4th Cir. 2003), where the U. S. Court of Appeal held that: “A judgment of forfeiture, imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982, is not a separate conviction; rather, it constitutes part of the sentence, in that it is utilized to enhance the punishment of a defendant who has already been convicted of a particular offence.” Learned counsel for the 2nd applicant submitted that since a confiscation order is part of the sentencing of a convicted person and since the purpose is to enhance the punishment of a defendant, the attached property of the respondent who has been convicted of drug trafficking should be confiscated to the state to serve as deterrent to would-be drug dealers. He stated that one of the cardinal principles of law is that people should not be allowed to profit from unlawful activity in general, and from crime in particular. He cited the case of Edward Macauley v. E.O.C.O. and Executive Secretary, NACOB, unreported, in which the High Court quoted with approval the case of R vrs. Cuthbertson [1981] AC 470 where it was unequivocally held that, “money and/or goods obtained from crime should be removed from the criminal.” He cited the case of R vrs. Wateford, 17th February, 1975, unreported, which was quoted in Edward Macauley vrs. E.O.C.O., supra, where the court held that, “the first thing the law should do is to ensure that those who break the law should not make money out of their wrong doing.” It also held that “the legislation under which the application was brought was a means by which drug dealers can be deprived of their assets.” 
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Learned counsel for the 2nd applicant submitted that the court should confiscate the attached property of the respondent drug convict so that the respondent herein would be deprived of any profit from his drug dealing. He stated that in dealing with confiscation proceedings, the court takes a very hard line approach to ensure that criminals, and for that matter drug dealers do not benefit in any way from their criminal activities. He stressed that in the case of R v. Smith (David Cadman) 2001 App. Cases, the court took a hard line approach to deprive the defendant of his assets. The House of Lords, speaking through Lord Rodger of Earlsferry commented that, “If in some circumstances it (the confiscation scheme) can operate in a penal or even a draconian manner, then that may not be out of place in a scheme for stripping criminals of the benefits of their crimes.” Learned counsel for the 2nd applicant stated that in line with the hard line approach to confiscation issues, the law is that the burden of proof as to whether or not a property is legitimately acquired is on the person whose property has been attached for confiscation.  Section 45 of Act 804 stipulates that: “45.(1)In determining whether or not a confiscation or pecuniary penalty order should be made, the Court shall presume that the property or income which is the subject of the application, including the property and income indicated in the declaration was acquired as a result of a serious offence.  (2) The burden of proof that the property or income which is the subject of the application or the declaration of property and income is lawfully acquired property is on the person convicted for the offence in relation to which the application is made.”  He submitted that in the McIntosh case, supra, the respondent had been convicted for the offence of drug trafficking and the crown had applied for a confiscation order. It was argued that the mandatory assumption in confiscation proceedings that the defendant, the accused, has the benefit from criminal conduct unless he can show the assumption to be “incorrect” is an unfair reversal of the burden of proof which runs counter to the express presumption of innocence as enshrined and guaranteed under Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which the United Kingdom had then ratified and adopted. This argument of the respondent therein was totally rejected by the Privy Council. The European Court of Human Rights itself appears to agree with the legal position adopted by the Privy Council in the McIntosh case that it is the respondent who is to proof that he 
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acquired his properties through a legitimate source. In Philips v. United Kingdom, supra, the European Court held that:  “... the right to be presumed innocent under Article 6(2) arises only in connection with the particular offence “charged”. Once the person has properly been proved guilty of that offence, Article 6(2) can have no application in relation to allegations made about the accused’s character and conduct as part of the sentencing process …” Learned counsel for the 2nd applicant submitted that similarly, in our jurisprudence, the golden rule is that a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty and the burden of proof is on the prosecution. It is, however, not the case in a confiscation application such as in this instant application. The respondent has already been convicted of conspiracy to export heroin, a narcotic drug. The burden of proving that the attached properties are not tainted, illegal or are acquired from legitimate business must therefore be on the respondent and not on the applicants.  He stated that it is an open knowledge that there is a lot of money in dealing in illicit drug trafficking. He said the main motivation for illicit drug dealers is to make huge sums of money. He contended that it was clear from the indictment of the respondent a copy of which the applicants exhibited as “Exhibit A1” that the respondent was the leader of a Ghana-based heroin trafficking organization responsible for importing into the United States multiple kilograms of heroin. He submitted that this evidence was not controverted and that as a leader of a ring of drug dealers, it is their view that the respondent’s properties were acquired through dealing in drugs. The respondent cannot, therefore, be allowed to enjoy his illegal properties.  It was submitted that the respondent has also stated in his affidavit in opposition that house Plot No. 2A Mango Close, Dansoman, Accra, including the building thereon and its fixtures, belongs to his son who has been given the power of attorney by his father to defend this suit. In an attempt to justify his claim of ownership of the property at 2A Mango Close, the claimant gave evidence on 11th January, 2016. The sum of his case is that he bears the same name as his father and that he acquired the property 8 years ago. According to him, he worked in several places in the U.K. and worked as a barber earning £600.00 a week where he got money to purchase the plot in question at GH¢18,000.00. The applicants admit that even though the indenture of 2A Mango Close bears the name Edward Macualey, the signature on it is different from the known signature of the respondent. It is also admitted that Variety Bar, which is situated on 2A Mango 
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Close, is different from MACASH Enterprise of which the respondent owns 60% shares. Indeed, the two businesses have different registration numbers and bears different Tin numbers as well. It is, however, the view of the applicants that looking at the expenses of the claimant and his income from his barbering business, it is doubtful if he could have purchased and developed 2A Mango Close.  Learned counsel for the respondent herein and claimant stated that he will file an address but failed to do so. The respondents’ attorney contended that the said property is his. He asserted that he has the same name as that of his father, the respondent herein, but the respondent’s signature is quite clear and distinct from his (the attorney) and attached the documents to establish same. He also stressed that the said property was not used to facilitate or aid the commission of a serious offence of a person convicted; nor was it derived, obtained or realized as a result of the serious offence. He led evidence in court to prove his claim. He stated that the property is in the name of Edward Macauley but it is his and not for his father, the respondent herein. He testified that he owns a restaurant and a bar on the property in issue. According to the claimant herein, he acquired the property in issue eight (8) years ago when he decided to come and live in Ghana from London and has been operating it till date. He stated that, whilst in the UK, he worked in several places from which he got the money to purchase the property in issue. Under cross-examination, the claimant said he has three different signatures. He said he was earning about £600.00 pounds a week from the barbering shop in London, where he was a barber and owned shares in the barbering company. He said he bought the property in issue for GH¢18,000.00. He stated that he was in the U.K. from 1994-2007. The claimant said he has two wives and four children. He stated that his oldest child will be 15 years in March 2016 and was with him in the U. K. between the years 2003 to 2007. He said he put her in school, that is, Government Council School. He stated that he didn’t cater for any siblings between the years 2003 to 2007. He added that apart from the varieties pub and restaurant, he did not have any other companies or source of income between the years 2003 to 2008. He contended that he had cars, that is, BMW 318 I, Nissan Sentra and Mini Cooper. He admitted he was paying bills while in London.  The claimant disagreed with learned counsel for 2nd applicant’s suggestion that, looking at his expenses, there is no way he could have gotten money to buy the property in issue.  He insisted that, between the years 2003 to 2008, he had saved enough money to own it. He denied that he and his father, the respondent herein, 
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purportedly have the same name in order to outwit the law enforcement agencies. He explained that he has worked since 1995 which has enabled him to save enough money to acquire the plot in issue and build a restaurant. He added that he has three shops and he is operating one of them as Varieties Pub. He stated that he has rented out one of the shops for five years and he is putting up a barbering saloon in the third shop. He said he built on the land in 2008 and has witnesses to prove same.  The main evidence the claimant relied on to establish his claim to the property in dispute is that, although, he and his father, the respondent, have the same name, they have difference signatures. The claimant said he has three different signatures and he explained to the court that he was using a particular signature but at a point in time he was not comfortable using that so he changed it. He stated that he has the right to sign signatures that he can always re-sign back.  The essence of a signature is to let people know who authored a document. It is one of the things that can indicate that a document is genuine and binding on the one who signed it. The question is, as the claimant here says he has three different signatures, how would anyone know which one he is using and relying on at any given time? Should the public or anyone who relies on a particular signature of the claimant herein do so to their detriment? I do not think so. Since the claimant does not have one signature, how can any person rely on his signature when they are not consistent? This is more so when the issue of his signatures being different from that of his father, the respondent herein, is what the claimant is relying on to prove that the property is his. The claimant says he has different signatures which he claims he changes and uses depending on the circumstances. How can any court rely on such evidence?  This is one area of the law where the person who claims the property has the burden to establish ownership of same on the balance of probabilities. Although the claimant stated he bought the property himself, he didn’t tender any documentary proof of that, for example evidence of his earnings in U.K. etc., evidence of being part owner of the barbering shop in U.K., etc., not even one receipt in support of his earnings or acquisition of the property in issue. How can any court accept such evidence without cogent proof? The claimant did not also produce any witness to corroborate any of his claims. In the circumstances, it is difficult to attach much weight to his evidence. I have evaluated the totality of the evidence adduced in this case, the facts and circumstances of it and on the balance of probabilities, came to the conclusion that 
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the property in issue is the property of the respondent herein and not his lawful attorney, the claimant herein.  It is not in dispute that the respondent herein has been convicted of a narcotic offence and is currently serving his sentence. I am satisfied that the property herein was derived from the proceeds of crime.  In the circumstances, I hereby grant the application for confiscation and confiscate Plot No. 2A, Mango close, Dansoman, Accra, belonging to the respondent herein to the state.  There is no order as to costs.     
      (SGD.) GEORGINA MENSAH-DATSA 
(JUSTICE OF THEHIGH COURT)     
COUNSEL:  1. Mr. Daniel Amankwah for the 2nd applicant. 2. Mr. Kwesi Baffoe Intsiful for the respondent and claimant.     