JUDGMENT  
The Plaintiff is a limited liability company, duly registered under the laws of the Republic of Ghana and authorized by the Bank of Ghana to provide universal banking services.  The Defendant, a customer of the Plaintiff bank, is also a company limited by guarantee and incorporated under the laws of Ghana to engage in film production.  
In the Plaintiff’s statement of claim, as amended, the Plaintiff claims against the Defendant the following reliefs:     “a) The recovery of an amount of GH¢409,681.56 inclusive of interest from the Defendant being the total outstanding balance on two credit facilities of GH¢250,000.00 and GH¢20,000.00 granted to Defendant by Plaintiff in May, 2012 and November 2012 respectively as financial support for the completion of Defendant’s school building project the repayment of which have long expired but Defendant has failed and refused to do so despite repeated demands by Plaintiff. b) Interest on the total outstanding balance of GH¢409,681.56 calculated at 30% per annum from August 2014 till date of final payment. c) Cost inclusive of Counsel’s fees.”  
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The material facts which gave rise to the matter before me are stated in Plaintiff’s amended statement of claim and supported by the documentary evidence adduced by the Plaintiff in support of its case.  It is the case of the Plaintiff bank that it advanced an overdraft facility in the amount of GH¢250,000.00 to the Defendant on or about May, 2012 at the request of the Defendant to assist Defendant complete its school project (hereinafter referred to as the “Overdraft Facility”).  The Overdraft Facility was to attract an agreed interest rate of 30% per annum and was to be fully repaid within twelve (12) months, effective June, 2012 to expire at the end of May, 2013.  See Exhibits “A” and “B”, which are the Letter from William Akuffo, the Managing Director of the Defendant company by which the Defendant applied for the Overdraft Facility and the approval letter issued by the Plaintiff in approval of the Overdraft Facility, respectively.  According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant, sometime in November, 2012, requested for and was granted further a commercial loan of GH¢20,000.00 for three (3) months to expire in February, 2013, (hereinafter, the “Commercial Loan”).  To evidence this transaction, the Plaintiff tendered in evidence Exhibit “C”, the loan application letter written by the Managing Director of Defendant Company, William Akuffo, and Exhibit “D” the commercial loan approval letter dated 15th November, 2012 issued by the Plaintiff.  These two (2) credit facilities are referred to herein, collectively, as the “Credit Facilities”.  
It is Plaintiff’s case that the repayment periods of the Credit Facilities have long expired with the total outstanding balance of GH¢409,681.56, as at August 2014, remaining due and unpaid by the Defendant.  Plaintiff tendered in evidence Exhibits “E” and “F”, the statements of accounts on the Credit Facilities in proof of the balance outstanding in respect of the Credit Facilities.  Plaintiff further alleged that several repeated demands on the Defendant to pay up its debts were to no avail.  As a result, in August, 2014, it instructed its Solicitors to issue a formal demand notice, Exhibit “G” to the Defendant to demand the repayment of the outstanding balance due.    
It is the Plaintiff’s final contention that the Defendant has failed, refused and neglected to fulfill its part of the terms and conditions governing the grant of the Credit Facilities and that unless compelled  by this honourable court, the Defendant will continue to default to repay the loans to the detriment of the Plaintiff.    
The evidence of the record establishes that on 22nd January, 2015, the Defendant entered appearance through its Solicitor, Thomas Acquah, Esq. of Law Temple who filed on 26th February, 2016 a statement of defence to the suit on behalf of Defendant.   
The following issues were set down for trial after pre-trial settlement failed: 1. Whether or not the repayment of the credit facility of GH¢250,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Ghana Cedis) and the interest thereon extended to Defendant by Plaintiff in May, 2012 has expired? 2. Whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to the claims endorsed on the Writ of Summons? 
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3. Any other issues arising out of the pleadings.   Before delivering my judgment, certain developments that took place during the trial of this case necessitate that I give a brief procedural history of this case.  After attempts at court assisted settlement of the case failed at the pre-trial settlement level, the case was referred to this court to conduct the trial.  On 15th day of March, 2016, this Court granted the Plaintiff leave to amend its statement of claim. The amended statement of claim was filed on the same day and a copy served on the Defendant as evidenced by the Affidavit of Service on the docket before me.  The Defendant however failed to file any response to the Plaintiff’s amended statement of Claim, by way of an amended statement of defence or otherwise.  
It is noted, further, that neither the Defendant nor its solicitor appeared in court to contest the trial notwithstanding the fact that the Defendant was served with several hearing notices of the scheduled dates for trial as well as Court’s Notes through its Solicitor, as evidenced by the numerous affidavits of service on the record.  A review of the docket provides no evidence as to support a finding that Mr. Thomas Acquah, the Solicitor who entered appearance on the behalf of Defendant, subsequently withdrew his representation of the Defendant in this case.  Furthermore, not only did the Defendant fail to make any officer of the company available to participate in a court assisted audit to reconcile the accounts as between the parties herein, it also failed to comply with the case management orders made by this Court.  In that regard, the statement of defence filed by the Defendant was struck out by the Court on 16th March, 2016 in accordance with Order 32 rule 7A of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004, (CI 47) (as amended) by CI 87.  
In the circumstance, the only triable issue that is material to the disposition of this suit, in my view, is as follows: 1. Whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to its reliefs as endorsed on the writ of summons and amended by the amended statement of claim.  
The general rule is that where a party to a civil suit raises issues that are essential to the success of his claim, he assumes the onus of proof, whether it is the plaintiff who asserts a fact or the defendant who makes a counterclaim.  See BANK OF WEST AFRICA LTD. v. ACKUN [1963] 1 GLR 176-182 where the court held that the onus of proof in civil cases depends upon the pleadings and the party who in his pleadings raises an issue essential to the success of his case assumes the burden of proof. The court applied the case of HUYTON-WITH-ROBY U.D.C. v. HUNTER [1955] 2 All E.R. 398, C.A.  In the case of FAIBI v. STATE HOTELS CORPORATION [1968] GLR 471-480 the court also held that “… [t]he onus in law lay upon the party who would lose if no evidence was led in the case; and where some evidence had been led it lay on the party who would lose if no further evidence was led”.  The Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) (hereinafter, “NRCD 323”), encapsulates the foregoing principle in section 14 where it uses the term the “burden of persuasion” and provides that the asserting party must prove each fact of 
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his claim, the existence or non-existence of which is essential to the claim or defence he is asserting.   
Section 12(1) of NRCD 323 provides a further element to the above stated general rule to the effect that in a civil case, such as the one in question, the burden of persuasion requires proof by a “preponderance of probabilities” defined in section 12(2) as “that degree of certainty of belief in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court by which it is convinced that the evidence of a fact is more probable than its non-existence”.     
From the foregoing, therefore, it is clear that for the Plaintiff, to succeed on its claims that it ought to be granted the right to recover from the Defendant the amount of the Credit Facilities that it alleges remain outstanding and due, it assumes the onus of proving its assertions against the Defendant. Plaintiff is therefore duty bound to establish the requisite degree of belief in my mind by adducing enough evidence to show that the likelihood of the circumstances being alleged is more probable than not.  
Plaintiff’s claims and documentary evidence were corroborated by the testimony of Plaintiff’s representative, Mr. Devine Kudjonu, the Credit Manager, given on oath to this court.  The court finds that the Defendant failed to advance any defence in its behalf to controvert the testimony of the Plaintiff’s witness and/or the documentary evidence of the Plaintiff before this court. Indeed, the statement of defence filed by the Defendant was struck out, the Defendant did not file any evidence in support of its case and finally, the Defendant failed to attend court to cross examine the Plaintiff’s witness.  The position of the law on not cross-examining a witness after he has given his evidence in chief, is well settled.  In the case of TAKORADI FLOUR MILLS v. SAMIR FARIS [2005-06] SCGLR 882, Ansah JSC referred to the case of TUTU v. GOGO, [Civil Appeal No. 25/67 dated 28th April, 1969, unreported] digested in 1969 CC, 76, where Ollenu JA stated thus: “In law, where evidence is led by a party and that evidence is not challenged by his opponent in cross-examination, and the opponent did not tender evidence to the contrary, the facts deposed to in the evidence are deemed to have been admitted by the party against whom it is led, and must be accepted by the court.”  
In the circumstances the court is left with no option than to believe the claims of the Plaintiff as corroborated by the testimony of its witness and its documents tendered in evidence. In stating thus, I am guided by the holding of the court in the leading case of MAJOLAGBE v. LARBI [1959] GLR 190 which supports the principle that when a party makes an averment in his pleading which is capable of proof in a positive way and the averment is denied, that averment can be sufficiently proved by testimony on oath supported by some corroborative evidence.  See further the cases of KLUTSE v. NELSON [1965] GLR, 537, SC and ZABRAMA v. SEGBEDZI [1991] 2 GLR 221, CA. 
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The documentary evidence before the court and the uncontroverted testimony of Plaintiff’s Representative shows that it is not in dispute that the parties intended to create legal relations and their intentions were reduced into a binding contract as between the parties.  In DANIELE CONSTRUCTION v. MABEY & JOHNSON [2006] 4 M.L.R.G. 101 at 116, Akoto Bamfo J.A. stated that:   “An agreement is reached by a process of offer and acceptance and for a determination as to whether parties have reached an agreement, one should find whether there has been a definite offer by one party and an acceptance of that offer by the other, the test being whether the parties have all outward appearances as agreed in the same terms upon the same subject matter”.  
Also, in the unreported case of NTHC LTD v. ANTWI, (February 4, 2009), the Supreme Court held that:  
“In the instant case, the letter of January 17, 2005 constituted an offer and not an invitation to treat, and that offer was converted into a contract by the plaintiff’s acceptance letter of January 31, 2005. There was, therefore, clearly an intention to create legal relations and the plaintiff’s undertaking to pay the purchase price was consideration enough to result in the formation of a contract.”  
All the requirements for the existence of a valid contract were present in the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.  There was agreement as to all the material terms of the agreements governing the Credit Facilities.  Additionally, these four (4) main ingredients were also present; the parties had capacity to enter into the agreements, there was offer and acceptance of the key terms of the agreements on which both parties were ad idem, there was consideration for the services and the intention of the parties to create legal relations could not be disputed.    
Exhibits “A” and “C”, which are the letters written by William Akuffo, the Managing Director of the Defendant company by which the Defendant applied for both the Overdraft Facility and the Commercial Loan constituted the offer by the Defendant company which was converted into a contract by Plaintiff bank’s acceptance in the form of the approval letters issued by the Plaintiff in approval of the Overdraft Facility and the Commercial Loan, Exhibits “B” and “D” respectively.  The relevant terms and conditions of the Overdraft Facility were contained in Exhibit “B”, which provided that upon acceptance by the Defendant, the facility would attract an interest rate of 30% per annum and the principal and agreed interest was to be repaid within twelve (12) months to expire in May 2013.  In respect of the Commercial Loan, the material terms and conditions thereof were stated in Exhibit “D” as follows: the loan duration was for three (3) months to expire in February, 2013 and interest on any unpaid principal was to be calculated at 30% per annum.  By 
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executing Exhibits “B” and “D”, under the sub heading “ACCEPTANCE”, the Defendant is deemed to have accepted the foregoing terms and conditions and also accepted to be bound by them.  
I am, therefore satisfied that it is more probable than not that as agreed between the parties herein, the Plaintiff advanced to the Defendant the sums of money in the amounts claimed by the Plaintiff in its statement of claim with the total indebtedness of the Defendant on the Credit Facilities standing at Four Hundred and Nine Thousand, Six Hundred and Eighty One Ghana Cedis, Fiftysix Pesewas (GH¢409,681.56) as at 1st August 2014.  See Exhibits “E” and “F”, the statements of accounts on the Credit Facilities tendered in proof of the balance outstanding in respect of the Credit Facilities.    
Further, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence to support a finding that the Defendant failed, refused and neglected to fulfill its obligations under the terms and conditions governing the grant of the Credit Facilities.  The Defendant failed to pay its stated indebtedness upon the expiration of both Credit Facilities and it refused to pay up in spite of the several demands made on it by Plaintiff so to do as evidenced by Exhibit “G”, the formal demand notice issued by Plaintiff’s Solicitors demanding payment of the Defendant’s outstanding debt, which was due and payable.  In holding thus, I would like to borrow the words of Acquah, JSC (as he then was) which captures succinctly the obligation of a borrower to repay the loan it has contracted in the case of BARCLAYS BANK (GHANA) LTD v SAKARI [1997-98] 1 GLR 746 - 767:  
“Now, what is the obligation created under this loan contract, a breach of which would entitle the other to sue? The obligation of the bank was to advance the money, which it did, and that of the defendant was to repay the loan together with interest, if any.  This is the obligation of the parties under this loan contract, and indeed, almost all loan contracts. When a bank lends money to its customer, the obligation of the customer is to repay the loan. If the loan is sought for, let’s say, a business venture, and the business flops resulting in massive financial loss to the customer, this misfortune, though may be due to no fault of this customer, does not change the nature of the obligation of the customer to repay the loan he had contracted for.  He will still be obliged to fulfill his obligation.  Thus, the obligation of a borrower in a loan contract as opposed to other types of contracts, is to repay the loan and not the performance of the purpose for which the loan was sought.”   
The breach of the Defendant’s obligations under the terms and conditions of the Credit Facilities thus gave the Plaintiff the right to sue for the recovery of the sums claimed.  I therefore find that the Plaintiff has met its burden of proving that the Defendant owes it the sums of money claimed as per the reliefs (a) and (b) as amended by the amended statement of claim.    
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From the foregoing, I am satisfied that the Plaintiffs’ action succeeds.  Judgment is entered for Plaintiff in favour of reliefs (a) and (b) as endorsed on its writ of summons as amended by the amended statement of claim.    
I award costs in the sum of GH¢40,000.00 in favour of the Plaintiff against the Defendant.    .  
                                                                                                    (Sgd)             ……………………………………………….. JUSTICE JENNIFER ABENA DADZIE     JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT     (COMMERCIAL DIVISION)       COUNSEL:     MARTIN MIREKU, ESQ., OF ABORIGINES LEGAL CONSULT, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF THOMAS ACQUAH, ESQ., OF LAW TEMPLE, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT   
CASES REFERRED TO:  
BANK OF WEST AFRICA LTD. v. ACKUN [1963] 1 GLR 176-182 
HUYTON-WITH-ROBY U.D.C. v. HUNTER [1955] 2 All E.R. 398, C.A.   
FAIBI v. STATE HOTELS CORPORATION [1968] GLR 471-480 
TAKORADI FLOUR MILLS v. SAMIR FARIS [2005-06] SCGLR 882 TUTU v. GOGO, [Civil Appeal No. 25/67 dated 28th April, 1969 
MAJOLAGBE v. LARBI [1959] GLR 190  
KLUTSE v. NELSON [1965] GLR, 537, SC  
ZABRAMA v. SEGBEDZI [1991] 2 GLR 221, CA. 
DANIELE CONSTRUCTION v. MABEY & JOHNSON [2006] 4 M.L.R.G. 101 at 116 
NTHC LTD v. ANTWI, (Unreported, February 4, 2009, Supreme Court) 
BARCLAYS BANK (GHANA) LTD v. SAKARI [1997-98] 1 GLR 746 - 767 