nable doubt. Section 13 (1) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (Act 323) 
of In Re Poku (d’sed); Appiah Poku & Others [2011] SCGLR 162 the Supreme 

“It is an entrenched trite principle of law that fraud unravels everything and, that a judgment obtained by fraud can be impeached b
y fresh action. However, this general rule is not a right conferred by the common law free from all encumbrances or obligations. One such encumbrance, which is relevant to the facts of this case, is the necessity to exercise diligence at the first instance. It is clearly established that if a party be actually or constructively cognisant of fraudulent matters in the first action but fails to avail himself to them at that time, he cannot thereafter seek to impeach the decree of the court on those grounds”.
