 
RULING  
The main issue requiring my adjudication in this application is whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on its reliefs as endorsed on the writ of summons and the statement of claim. 
A brief facts of the case is that the Plaintiff, a finance and leasing company, granted a loan facility to the Defendants which was disbursed in three (3) tranches.  As security for the loan, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants guaranteed separately to be personally liable either jointly or severally with 1st Defendant in the event of default by the 1st Defendant.  As further security for the loan, 1st Defendant mortgaged its filing station situate at Ashaley Botwe, Accra, in favour of the Plaintiff.  The relationship between the parties subsequently went sour as the 1st Defendant, as alleged by the Plaintiff, failed to meet its repayment commitments in respect of the 1st and 3rd tranches resulting in the suit before this court.   
The Plaintiff in its writ asked for the following reliefs: 
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(a) The sum of GH?674,923.27 (Six Hundred and Seventy Four Thousand, Nine Hundred and Twenty Three Ghana Cedis, Twenty Seven Pesewas) which said sum is the outstanding balance of two facilities granted to 1st Defendant and guaranteed by 2nd and 3rd Defendants as at the 8th day of October, 2014. (b) Compound monthly interest of 4.5% from the 9th day of October, 2014 till the date of final payment. (c) Cost inclusive of legal cost. 
And also for   (d)  Judicial sale of 1st Defendant’s mortgaged property situate at Ashaley Botwe, Accra, covering an area of 0.995 acres. 
I have read the application for summary judgment, the supporting affidavit and examined the various exhibits put in evidence by the Plaintiff and the defence filed by the Defendants to this suit.  I have also given thoughtful consideration to the provisions of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004, C.I. 47 (hereinafter, “C.I. 47”) and the principles governing the grant or otherwise of summary judgment.  It may be useful to reproduce the relevant extract from the C.I 47, which in Order 14 rule 1 provides as follows: 
“14.1. Where in an action a defendant has been served with a statement of claim and has filed appearance, the plaintiff may on notice apply to the court for judgment against the defendant on the ground that the defendant has no defence to a claim included in the writ or to a particular part of such a claim, or that the defendant has no defence to such a claim or part of a claim, except as to the amount of any damages claimed.” 
The essence of summary judgment was echoed by the Supreme Court in the case of BALLAST NEDAM BV vrs. HORIZON MARINE CONSTRUCTION LTD [2010] SCGLR 435 where the court held that  
“… although the procedure for summary judgment under Order 14 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47), enables the plaintiff to obtain speedy and summary judgment without a trial even in cases where the defendant to the action expresses an intention to defend the action, the court may only grant the application in cases where the defendant is unable to set up a good defence or raise an issue which ought to be tried …” 
In the earlier decision of SANUNU vrs SALIFU [2009] SCGLR 586, the Supreme Court held that under Order 14 rule 1 of C.I. 47, a trial judge  
“… must come to the conclusion that on the face of the claim there is no defence to the action. A defence set up need only show that there is a triable issue; and leave to defend ought to be given unless there is clearly no defence in law and no possibility of a real defence on the question of fact.” 
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Elaborating on the objectives of summary judgment under Order 14, Akuffo, J.S.C., had this to say in the unreported Supreme Court case of SAM JONAH v. DUODU-KUMI [2003-2004] SCGLR 50: 
“The objective of Order 14 is to facilitate the early conclusion of actions where it is clear from the pleadings that the defendant therein has no cogent defence. It is intended to ‘prevent a plaintiff being delayed when there is no fairly arguable defence to be brought forward.” (See Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, 516). What we are, therefore, required to do in this appeal is to ascertain whether, on the totality of the pleadings and all matters before the High Court at the moment it delivered the Summary Judgement, the Respondent had, demonstrably, any defence, in law or on the available facts, such as would justify his being granted leave to defend the Appellant’s claim.” 
In reliance on what Kpegah J, (as he then was) stated in the case of YARTEL BOAT BUILDING CO. v. ANNAN [1991] 2 GLR 11,   at pages 14 and 15 of the report, I find that there is no denying the fact that the Applicant has met the preliminary requirements provided under Order 14 of C.I. 47 for an application for summary judgment.  That is, (i) the statement of claim was served on the defendant; (ii) The defendant entered appearance; and (iii) the affidavit in support of the application complied with the requirements of Order 14 rule 2 in providing a verification of the fact on which the relevant claim was based and stating that in the deponent’s belief, the Defendants have no defence to the claim.   
What then is the Plaintiff’s case?  In the instant case, it is the Plaintiff’s contention that the Defendants have not materially denied the substance of its claim and merely stating in their statement of defence that they do not owe Plaintiff the sum claimed and alleging that they have not been given a statement of account does not constitute a defence.   
The Defendant has not filed any affidavit in opposition to this application for summary judgement.  Per the provisions of Order 14 rule 3(1) which states as follows: “3. (1) A defendant may show cause against the application by affidavit or otherwise to the satisfaction of the Court” (emphasis added), 
the Court shall rely on the statement of defence filed by the Defendants to ascertain their case. In contrast to the Plaintiff’s claim, the issues raised as the grounds of defence in Defendant’s statement of defence can best be summarised in the following terms: 
(i) The ownership of the fuel station situated at Ashaley Botwe, which property was used in securing the loan.   (ii) Defendants contend that they have made substantial payments to the Plaintiff, which, if accounts are gone into would render their outstanding balance to be either far below the amount stated by the Plaintiff to be due and owing or would indicate that Defendants are not indebted to the Plaintiff at all; and   
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(iii) Defendants request for the appointment of an independent reputable accounting firm to ascertain the true amount owed to the Plaintiff. 
To challenge an Order 14 application, a defendant needs to show that there is a triable issue as to the facts.  In this respect, a defendant must raise an arguable issue that requires a trial in order to determine it once and for all.  See the BALLAST NEDAM BV vrs. HORIZON MARINE CONSTRUCTION LTD case, supra, where the court stated that “…where the defendant to the action expresses an intention to defend the action, the court may only grant the application in cases where the defendant is unable to set up a good defence or raise an issue which ought to be tried …”.  In other words, where the defendant raises an issue which ought to be tried, the court may not grant the application for summary judgement. 
The issue of the ownership of the fuel station which was mortgaged by the Defendants to secure the loan facility is not an issue that can simply be disposed of on affidavit evidence only.  A trial may have to be gone through to determine this issue once and for all.  Further, per the pleadings, it appears that there is a dispute regarding the amount of money that has been paid in relation to the balance that is due and outstanding.  Again, by requesting for accounts to be gone into, Defendants have raised a defence known in law.  In this regard, I am reminded of the dictum of Lord Coleridge C. J., in the case of SHEBA GOLD MINING CO., LTD. vrs. TRUBSHAWE [1892] 1 Q.B. 674 found at p. 682 of the report which was referred to by her Ladyship, Justice Cecilia Koranteng-Addow in the local case of GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK v. BINOO-OKAI [1982-83] GLR 74-81.  The latter case involved an application to enter final judgment on a specially indorsed writ and to claim interest up to final payment upon the defendant’s failure to settle its debt to the Plaintiff bank, under Order 14, r.1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A).  In her decision, Justice Cecilia KorantengAddow quoted Lord Coleridge C. J., as follows:  
“…We think this is as it should be.  It is important that a man, who is to be proceeded against summarily for judgment, should know exactly how much he has to pay if he wishes to stay the action, and should not be called upon to take the risks of calculation.” 
Indeed, on the authority of Order 29 rule 2 (1) of C.I. 47, any party to a suit may apply to the court at any stage in the cause or matter for any necessary accounts to be taken. 
I am of the candid opinion, therefore, that upon examining the entirety of the pleadings so far filed in the case, it is clear that there are triable issues (that is, the issue of the amount due and outstanding and the ownership of the fuel station) between the Plaintiff and the Defendants.  These are issues which cannot simply be swept under the rag and ignored and when taken together make the applicability of Order 14 impossible against the Defendants.  As noted by Kpegah J (as he then was) in the YARTEL BOAT BUILDING CO. v. ANNAN case, supra, Order 14 “… prescribes the procedure to be followed by a plaintiff who wishes to obtain summary judgment against his adversary. It does not confer on a plaintiff an absolute right to proceed for summary judgment in every case….” 
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I therefore refuse the application and award costs assessed at GH? 1,000.00 against the Plaintiff in favour of the Defendants jointly. 
    
         ……………………………………………….. JUSTICE JENNIFER ABENA DADZIE     JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT     (COMMERCIAL DIVISION)    
COUNSEL:  SAMUEL M. CODJOE, ESQ., OF LAW TRUST COMPANY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT THOMAS ACQUAH, ESQ., OF LAW TEMPLE FOR DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS  
CASES REFERRED TO: BALLAST NEDAM BV v. HORIZON MARINE CONSTRUCTION LTD [2010] SCGLR 435 
SANUNU v. SALIFU [2009] SCGLR 586 
SAM JONAH v. DUODU-KUMI [2003-2004] SGLR 50: 
YARTEL BOAT BUILDING CO. v. ANNAN [1991] 2 GLR 11, at pages 14, 15 
GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK v. BINOO-OKAI [1982-83] GLR 74-81 
SHEBA GOLD MINING CO., LTD. V. TRUBSHAWE [1892] 1 Q.B. 674 at p. 682  