J U D G M E N T  
Per an amended Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim dated 15th April, 2015, the plaintiff claims against the defendant the following reliefs: 
1. A declaration that the Plaintiff is the owner of the disputed property.  2. An order for the Ejection of the Defendant from the disputed property. 3. An order for the Defendant to pay to the Plaintiff an amount of One Thousand Eight Hundred US Dollars (US$1,800.00), or its equivalent in Ghana Cedis as rent of US$300.00 per month for her occupation of the disputed property from February 2013 to August 2013. 4. An order for the payment of Mesne Profits at the market rate of Seven Hundred US Dollars (US$700.00) for the Defendant’s unlawful occupation of the property from September 2013 to the date of the Defendant’s actual eviction from the property. 5. An order for the Defendant to return/replace all materials and equipment, as was found in the Plaintiff’s property, in a good tenantable state and to pay for any missing/damaged item at the existing market rate.  6. General damages for trespass.  
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7. Interest on all sums found liable and payable by the Defendant at the prevailing commercial rate from the date of payment to the date of final payment. 8. Costs.  
The defendant counter claimed as follows: 
A. A declaration that she is the beneficial owner of the property in dispute. B. A declaration that the writ of summons discloses not reasonable cause of action and is a nullity in law.  C. Legal fees and costs.  
The plaintiff claims ownership of the property in dispute, House No. C5 Manet Palms Estate, as a gift from his late brother, David Lamptey. He contended that the defendant, through an agent Robert Darko, rented the said property from his late brother, David Lamptey, and was to have vacated the premises in February 2013 but she is still in occupation of same. The defendant’s case is that she initially entered into a tenancy agreement with the late David Lamptey to rent the property in dispute and later purchased same from him so she is a beneficial owner of it.    
The issues for trial are the following: 
1. Whether or not the subject matter in dispute belongs to the Plaintiff or David Lamptey. 2. Whether or not David Lamptey had any title to pass to the defendant. 3. Whether or not the subject matter in dispute was fully furnished by David Lamptey for the Plaintiff before the Defendant moved in.  4. Whether or not the tenancy of the defendant has lapsed.  5. Whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to his claim. 6. Whether or not the Defendant is entitled to her counterclaim.  7. Any other issues arising out of the pleadings.  
The following additional issues were filed on 6th June, 2014. 
A. Whether or not the Defendant is the owner in equity of the building in dispute.  B. Whether or not the Defendant is entitled to her counterclaim.  
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On the issue of whether or not the subject matter in dispute belongs to the Plaintiff or David Lamptey, the plaintiff and his witnesses, PW1 Robert Asante Darko, an employee of Manet, and PW2, Kwabena Samuel Boateng, the Sales and Marketing manager of Manet Housing Limited led evidence to support their claim that it belongs to the plaintiff. The defendant disputed the plaintiff’s claims and contended that the disputed property belonged to the late David Lamptey  
Learned counsel for the defendant submitted in her written address that the disputed property was not gifted to the plaintiff and that assuming without admitting that it was indeed gifted to him, he did not accept the gift as he did not give aseda which is the customary law requirement to substantiate the acceptance of a gift. She submitted that in effect there was no gift and cited the Supreme Court case of Yoguo and Another v. Agyekum and Others (1966) GLR 482 in support of her submission. Learned counsel for the defendant stated that from the evidence of the plaintiff no aseda was given to the late David Lamptey as the plaintiff merely went to his house and said thank you. She contended that it can be inferred that the property was not actually gifted to the plaintiff and so the late David Lamptey retained title in same. She added that there are laid down principles or conditions to be satisfied to constitute a gift and quoted the Second Edition of Ghana Land Law and Conveyancing by B.J. Da Rocha and C.H.K. Lodoh at page 138 which listed the four requirements as follows: 
(1) The donor is the owner of the property (2) The donor expresses a clear intention to make a gift. A clear intention to make a gift is signified by divesting himself of all rights of ownership of the property, the subject matter of the gift.  (3) The subject matter of the gift must be delivered to the done during the lifetime of the donor (4) The donee must accept the gift during the lifetime of the donor by exercising rights of ownership of the subject matter of the gift.  
Learned counsel for the defendant contended that from the evidence on record none of the above stated conditions were fulfilled. She asserted that the late David Lamptey did not divest himself of all right of ownership of the property and this was evident from his conduct with regards to his dealings with the said property. She said, for example, he dealt with it as his own, the said property was not delivered to 
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the plaintiff during the lifetime of the David Lamptey and the plaintiff had no control nor did he exercise any right of ownership over the property during the lifetime of the late David Lamptey. She concluded that it can be assumed on the balance of probabilities that the late David Lamptey had no intention of gifting the disputed property to the plaintiff. She cited Sese v. Sese and others [1984-86] 2 GLR 166, Kwantreng v. Amassah (1962) 1 GLR 241 and Section 12 (2) of the Evidence Act, NRCD 323 in support of her submissions.    
Learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted in his written address that the plaintiff’s case is that he acquired the property sometime in 2011 after his brother the late David Lamptey bought the property for him as a gift and tendered exhibits A, B and D to support his case. He stated that PW2 corroborated the plaintiff’s evidence. He submitted that the concept of ownership of landed property entails possession of and title to the property. He stated that Section 2(a) of the Conveyancing Act 1973 (NRDC 175) provides that a contract for the transfer of an interest in land is not enforceable unless it is evidenced in writing and signed by the person against whom the contract is to be proved or by a person who was authorized to sign on behalf of that person. He submitted that exhibit A evidence the contract for the transfer of Manet (former owner of the property)’s interest in the disputed property to the plaintiff and serves as a proof of his title to the property. He added that by Clause C(1) (c) of exhibit K the executors of the estate of David Lamptey acknowledge the fact that the plaintiff was gifted with a three bedroom house at Manet Estate in Nsamapowmu by David Lamptey.   
It is a fact that the plaintiff led evidence and tendered exhibits in support of his case. Exhibit A is a sublease between the plaintiff and Manet. Exhibit B is a receipt from Manet to the plaintiff for payment of ground rent 2013 for C5-Palms. Exhibt D is a receipt issued to Mary Lamptey by ADMA for the payment of property rate for house numbers C5 and C6 at Manet Palms. Plaintiff tendered exhibit K the terms of settlement in Suit No. BPD 778/2103 in which it was stated that the property in dispute was given to the plaintiff by his late brother when he was alive. Under crossexamination the Plaintiff stated that to show appreciation, he and his sister and the family went and thanked his late brother in his house. This is evidence to support the satisfaction of the requirement of aseda for a valid gift. Under cross-examination the plaintiff said his late brother gifted the property to him, so he asked his permission before renting out the premises hence he called him on phone to tell him. This 
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evidence was corroborated by PW1. PW1 said he persuaded David Lamptey to rent out the place to the defendant and he said he would tell the plaintiff and later told him that the plaintiff had agreed and he told the defendant.  The plaintiff said the total rent for the 18 months was $5,400.00 and his late brother added some money to that and bought a vehicle for him. PW1 testified that he got to know the plaintiff through his late brother David Lamptey. PW1 said the late David Lamptey came to Manet and purchased three houses for his siblings and paid for them. PW1 stated that David Lamptey called his siblings in his presence and asked them to meet them at the site and the following week they came. He said they were two ladies and a man and David Lamptey introduced the older sister as Naomi, the other as Mary and the man as Isaac the plaintiff herein. PW1 said David Lamptey gave C6 to Mary, C5 to the plaintiff and L1 to Naomi. This evidence was corroborated by PW2. PW2 said C5 Manet Palms Ogbojo the property in dispute is owned by Manet and sub leased to the plaintiff herein as indicated in exhibit A. He said exhibit A is dated 16/07/13 but the property actually acquired earlier. He said when the property was acquired they were notified that the sibling in whose name the property was acquired would come for the document with identification and plaintiff came in 2013 with identification to show that he had been given C5. PW2 stated that the property was acquired by the late David Lamptey who acquired three properties for his siblings and paid for them in full in May 20122 and they proceeded to hand over the property since they had all been completed. He stressed that the late David Lamptey was clear about the name of the siblings and which house should go to whom, Mary Lamiokor Lamptey C6 and Naomi Lamiley Aryee L1. PW2 tendered exhibit L a search report dated 02/03/15 with plaintiff as the enquirer and exhibits M and N with respect to Mary and Naomi. PW2 said he knows PW1 and knows he had dealings with the property in dispute as he was assigned by their CEO to make sure the property was okay for the client after the late Lamptey paid for the property.   
From an evaluation of the totality of the evidence adduced, I find as a fact that the property in dispute belongs to the plaintiff herein.    
With respect to the issue of whether or not David Lamptey had any title to pass to the defendant, the plaintiff and his witnesses led evidence to establish that the late David Lamptey did not have title to the property so could not have passed same to the defendant whilst the defendant maintained that David Lamptey was the owner and so had title to pass to her.  
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Learned counsel for the defendant in her address said David Lamptey had title to pass to the defendant because the gift was not accepted by the plaintiff hence title in the property did not pass to the plaintiff but remained in the late David Lamptey and therefore he could transfer it to the defendant. 
Learned counsel for the plaintiff in his address stated that the defendant claimed that the late David Lamptey was the owner of the disputed property before his demise and that he sold the property to her but she failed to present any evidence to the court to support her claims. 
The defendant did not tender any documentary evidence neither did she call any witness in support of her case and claims. I have considered the evidence led and come to the conclusion that the late David Lamptey did not have any title in the disputed property to pass to the defendant.  
Concerning the issue of whether or not the subject matter in dispute was fully furnished by David Lamptey for the Plaintiff before the Defendant moved in, the plaintiff and his witnesses testified that the property was furnished before the defendant moved in but this was disputed by the defendant. 
According to the plaintiff he stayed three (3) months in Accra for the items to be brought and out of happiness he took pictures of the furnishing to show his wife and tendered some as exhibit E, E1-E7. Plaintiff also tendered exhibit F, a list of the furniture given to him by his late brother and explained that the list was prepared when the defendant was going to live in the house. According to PW1 David Lamptey worked on the houses and had curtains fixed and furniture brought into the rooms. Under cross-examination PW1 said he opened the door for the company to bring the curtains into the premises because the keys were with him. He added that a company brought the furniture and asked that he packs them into the house and he did, according to him they brought the items for the plaintiff and his sister’s homes. He said the sounds systems and TV were from Samsung Company and the TV is plasma and large Samsung home theatre. According to PW1 the late David Lamptey ordered the items through the company and sent his errand boy called Kwame. Under cross-examination PW1 insisted that it was the late David Lamptey who purchased the items in the disputed premises and not the defendant and stated that he handed over the keys to the defendant with all the items fixed in the rooms. According to 
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PW1 David Lamptey, the defendant and he met in March 2011 and David Lamptey told the defendant to enter the house with only her bag because the house had been furnished. He said the property was furnished with chairs, sound system etc., when the defendant moved into the property in August 2011. PW1 said the items in exhibit F were brought by the late David Lamptey to the premises in dispute. PW2 said the property was sold without furnishing but they added optional additions i.e. air conditions and a water tank at the client’s request. The defendant said she moved into the premises in June 2011 and the tenancy was supposed to expire in June 2013 but it was not documented. According to the defendant, when she was moving into the premises, it was newly built and air conditioners and a generator were being installed but it was not furnished, and there was no TV, fridge or sound system. The defendant said she asked the late David Lamptey for an agreement and he said he will have it prepared for her to sign neither did he give her a receipt as he said he was going to furnish her with that later. Under cross-examination the defendant said she furnished the property before she moved in and that she bought the furniture at Furniture City at about GH¢10, 000.00 but cannot find the receipts. She said she spent about GH¢25,000.00 on appliance and furniture and went to Samsung head office to try and retrieve the receipts but they said they had changed their system and computerized it.  
Learned counsel for the plaintiff in his written address stated that the plaintiff led evidence that his brother, the late David Lamptey, furnished all the three properties he acquired for his siblings at Manet and presented exhibit E series as pictures he took on the 4th May 2011 as digitally imprinted on the said exhibits of the furnished property in dispute. He said the plaintiff also tendered exhibit F as the list of the equipment /furnishings in the property before it was rented to the defendant. He submitted that PW1 the former caretaker of the disputed property testified that the property was furnished with the items in exhibit F before the defendant rented it and said one of the considerations he suggested to Mr. Lamptey to rent out the property was to safeguard the furnishings against burglary. He added that PW2 testified that certain equipment like air conditioners and water tank were added to the property at Mr. Lamptey’s request giving credence to the fact that Mr. Lamptey furnished the property and not the defendant. He contended that the defendant claimed she personally furnished the disputed property but did not substantiate her claims. 
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It is obvious from the evidence adduced that the subject matter in dispute was fully furnished by David Lamptey for the Plaintiff before the Defendant moved in. 
The issue of whether or not the tenancy of the defendant has lapsed will be determined together with the issue of whether or not she should be ejected from the disputed property as they are related.  
To determine the issue of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to his claim, the plaintiff adduced evidence with supporting documents and it was corroborated by his witnesses. 
Learned counsel for the defendant said the plaintiff has no title in the property as he claims that it was gifted to him by the late David Lamptey but proffered no evidence in support. She stated that it is bizarre that the plaintiff claims US$1,800.00 or its equivalent in Ghana Cedis as rent of US$300.00 per month for her occupation of the disputed property from February to August 2013, as he was not able to establish or ascertain the actual rent value agreed between the late David Lamptey and the defendant. It was contended that the plaintiff relied on PW1 who testified that he was not privy to the discussion between the defendant and the late David Lamptey. It was submitted that from the evidence of the plaintiff and his witnesses he has not demonstrated the basis for arriving at the figure he claims and it makes the defendant’s story more probable than that of the plaintiff. It was also submitted that the Rent Act, Act 220, as amended by the Local Government Act 1993, Act 462 provides for the assessment of the rent to be done by the rent Magistrate under Section 10 of the said Act. It was stated that the jurisdiction to assess rent lies within the jurisdiction of the rent Magistrate and as such the plaintiff has come to the wrong avenue in respect of this particular claim. 
Learned counsel for the defendant submitted that on the issue of Mesne profits the plaintiff has failed to address the court on how he arrived at the figures he is seeking to recover and that it appears from the evidence on record that the figures were arrived at arbitrarily. It was stated that the plaintiff has not been able to show cause as to why the court should grant him this remedy. It was asserted that the authorities are clear on the circumstances under which such a remedy will be granted one of which is where the party had been able to demonstrate that a person has trespassed onto his property or that there has been a wrongful occupation of his property which 
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wrong has caused him to suffer and from which he is seeking that remedy. It was submitted that the plaintiff has not been able to demonstrate or prove any of these so he is not entitled to this relief.      
The plaintiff prayed for a declaration that he is the owner of the disputed property. Learned counsel for the plaintiff stated that the plaintiff presented credible evidence to show his root of title and establish his ownership of the disputed property. Plaintiff request an order for the ejection of the defendant from the disputed property. The plaintiff said the defendant should have vacated the premises in February 2013 but did not and when he went to see her in February 2013 she told him to give her some time to vacate the premises so he gave her six (6) more months that is to August 2013 and told her to pay rent.  The plaintiff stated that the defendant did not pay the rent neither did she vacate the property so on 14/09/2013 he wrote to her to vacate the premises and leave the items in the property (exhibit G) but she is still in the premises. The plaintiff tendered exhibit H dated 02/12/13, his summons of the defendant at the Rent Control for her to be evicted and exhibits J and J1 letters from the defendant’s lawyer asking that the matter be discontinued and taken to court. He said the defendant did not refer the matter to the court as advised in exhibit J1.  
Learned counsel for the plaintiff stated in his address that the plaintiff is the owner of the disputed property and the defendant is an unlawful occupant of same because her tenancy agreement for the use of the property has lapsed and she has challenged her landlord’s ownership of the property. He submitted that from the defendant’s case she was required to move out of the disputed premises in June 2013 and she paid rent for that period. He argued that since the said payment of rent for June 2013, the defendant has not atoned tenancy to the plaintiff and she has not paid rent for her use or occupation of the property. It was submitted that the law is well settled that a tenant who denies the title of his landlord is liable to an immediate forfeiture of the lease or tenancy as held in Safo & Ano. V. Badu [1977] 2 GLR 63.  Learned counsel for the plaintiff asserted that the defendant after challenging the title of the plaintiff and not paying rent is liable to an order for ejectment from the property.  
I have evaluated the evidence led and declare that the plaintiff is the owner or has title to the property in dispute. 
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The plaintiff requested an order for the defendant to pay to him an amount of One Thousand Eight Hundred US Dollars (US$1,800.00), or its equivalent in Ghana Cedis as rent of US$300.00 per month for her occupation of the disputed property from February 2013 to August 2013. Learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff’s case is that the defendant’s tenancy was from August 2011 to February 2013 and she paid rent for that period, whilst the defendant claims it was from June 2011 to June 2013 and she paid rent for that period. The plaintiff’s counsel stressed that the tenancy agreement was unwritten and the only other person besides the defendant who was part of the whole discussions on the agreement was PW1 testified that the tenancy was for 18 months at a rent of US$300.00 per month and he was paid a month’s rent of US$300.00 as agency fee for his role in getting the property for the defendant. He stated that exhibit G supports the plaintiff’s testimony that he went to see the defendant in February 2013 and gave her six months grace period to move out of the property. He stressed that that letter indicated that the defendant had been given and earlier notice to quit and that the letter was a reminder to that earlier notice. He said the defendant gave evidence that she received exhibit G. The plaintiff’s counsel contended that the defendant did not reply to the letter to challenge the plaintiff’s demands or correct the grace periods given in the letter and submitted that exhibit G and PW1’s evidence corroborates the plaintiff’s evidence that the tenancy was for 18 months and expired in February 2013. He stated that the defendant did not pay any rent for the six months grace period at US$300.00 a month so the plaintiff is entitled to the US$1,800.00 or for any such period as the court may determine.  The plaintiff’s claim is that the defendant’s tenancy lapsed in February 2013. The defendant contended that it was to end in June 2013 and she made full payment for that period. According to the plaintiff he did not move into the property immediately because he was in Adukrom working. He tendered exhibit C a tenancy agreement to prove that he lived at Adukrom, and said it was made 20/01/2010 and expired on 20/01/2013.  
PW1 said he got to know the defendant in 2001 when she came to the site with a man and said she wanted a house to rent and expressed interest in a house like C5. PW1 said the defendant said she would pay $300.00 per month as rent but could afford one and half years advance payment instead of the usual two years advance normally paid.  According to PW1, David Lamptey, the defendant and he met in March 2011 and David Lamptey told the defendant to enter the house with only her 
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bag because the house had been furnished. PW1 said the next day the defendant made him call David Lamptey and she paid $5,400.00 for the one and half years rent at $300.00 a month. PW1 said the defendant gave him $300.00 because he had negotiated for the rent. He said David Lamptey did not give the defendant a receipt and said he will ask his lawyer to draw up a tenancy agreement but he cannot tell whether or not the tenancy agreement was given to the defendant. Defendant gave evidence that PW1 showed her the house she lives in presently and introduced the late David Lamptey to her and they came into a tenancy agreement to rent the place. The defendant said she paid $300.00 to PW1 as fees he charged for introducing the late David Lamptey to her. The defendant said the agreed rent was $250.00 a month for a period of two years and she paid rent advance of $6,000.00 for 24 months. The defendant said her friend Gifty Quarm was present at the negotiation for the rent on the disputed property.  She said at the meeting the late David Lamptey asked PW1 to get out of the room so he was not present during the negotiation. Under crossexamination PW1 admitted he does not speak Ga and that he did not understand the conversation that went on between the late David Lamptey and the defendant. He also admitted that after he had introduced the defendant, the late David Lamptey asked that he leaves them alone so he was not privy to the discussion between them. He stated that he cannot remember the exact date the defendant’s tenancy commenced but he handed over the keys to her in August 2011 and the tenancy was to expire in February 2013 thereabouts.   
I have considered the evidence led and come to the conclusion that it is in the interest of justice to grant the plaintiff the relief sought herein. 
The plaintiff claimed an order for the payment of Mesne Profits at the market rate of Seven Hundred US Dollars (US$700.00) for the Defendant’s unlawful occupation of the property from September 2013 to the date of the Defendant’s actual eviction from the property.  
PW1 asserted that at the time of giving evidence (April 2015), if a house is furnished at Manet the rental will be $800.00 and in 2013 the rental of such premises was around $750.00 a month. PW2 said he knows the property in dispute. PW2 said the rental rates are market driven and said for the property in dispute, a three bedroom house, unfurnished would fetch not more than $400.00 but a furnished one will cost 
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between $600.00 and $650.00 in 2011 and in 2013 the furnished property would cost about $800.00 a month at most.  
Learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff is entitled to claim for any specified loss he suffered as a result of the defendant’s trespass to his land. He stated that the plaintiff lost rent for the unlawful period the defendant occupied the property and he is entitled to claim for mesne profits in addition to general damages for trespass and he cited Badu v. Adampa (1976) 2 GLR 450. He asserted that PW1 and PW2 said the rental value for the disputed property in 2013 was US$750.00 and US$ 800.00 per month respectively. He said that based on their evidence the plaintiff’s claim for US$ 700.00 per month as mesne profit for the defendant’s unlawful use of the property from September 2013 is very reasonable and urged the court to grant same.  
I have considered the evidence led and come to the conclusion that it is in the interest of justice to grant the plaintiff the relief sought herein. 
The plaintiff requested an order for the defendant to return/replace all materials and equipment, as was found in the Plaintiff’s property, in a good tenantable state and to pay for any missing/damaged item at the existing market rate. Learned counsel for the plaintiff stated that the defendant rented the property with furnishings as depicted in exhibits E series and F so the plaintiff is entitled to the return of the property with the furnished items. It was submitted that, besides normal wear and tear, the property and its furnished items are required to be returned in good tenantable state. It was asserted that the plaintiff is entitled to a contingent order for the defendant to pay for any missing or damaged items from the list of furnishing as depicted in exhibits E series and F. 
Having evaluated the evidence adduced I grant the plaintiff this relief as it is warranted by the evidence led. 
The plaintiff claimed general damages for trespass. Learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the defendant has unlawfully occupied the disputed property from September 2013 to date and the unauthorized occupation of the property by the defendant will fall as trespass and the plaintiff is entitled to general damages for trespass. He stated that trespass is actionable per se and general damages for trespass follow as a matter of course. He asserted that the plaintiff testified that he has been 
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separated from his family for the past two years as a result of the defendant’s unlawful occupation of his house and submitted that this fact should play a consideration in the award of any damages for trespass.  
In Attorney-General v. Faroe Atlantic Co. Ltd[2005-2006] SCGLR 271 at 290, the Supreme Court, per Dr. Seth Twum JSC stated: 
  “….a claim for damages for breach of contract will entitle the plaintiff to nominal damages only unless the plaintiff gives particulars of special damage. No particulars of general damages are ever ordered…General damages are such as the law will presume to be natural or probable consequence of the defendant’s act. They arise by inference of the law and need not therefore be proved by evidence.  
As the Supreme Court per Twum JSC held in Delmas Agency Ghana Ltd. Vrs. Food Distributors International Ltd. [2007-2008] 2 SCGLR 748, holding (3): 
 “General damages is such as the law will presume to be the natural or     probable consequences of the defendant’s act. It arises by inference of law and therefore need not to proved by evidence. The law implies general damage in every infringement of an absolute right. The catch is that only nominal damages are awarded. Where the plaintiff has suffered a properly quantifiable loss, he must plead specifically his loss and prove it strictly. If he does not, he is not entitled to anything unless general damages as are also appropriate.”     
I have evaluated the totality of the evidence led, the facts and circumstances of this case and consider GH¢ 1,000.00 as adequate as general damages and I award same to the 1st defendant herein against the plaintiffs.  
The plaintiff requested interest on all sums found liable and payable by the defendant at the prevailing commercial rate from the date of payment to the date of final payment. Most of the claims made by the plaintiff have been quoted in US$ for the Ghana Cedi equivalent to be paid. This takes care of the issue of inflation with respect to the Ghana Cedi for which a claim for interest would be justified. In view of that I do not think it is fair to claim interest on the amounts claimed. The claim for interest is therefore denied and dismissed.  
The issues of whether or not the defendant is entitled to her counterclaim and that of whether or not the defendant is the owner in equity of the building in dispute will be 
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determined together. According to the defendant about eight months of living in the premises the late David Lamptey told her about his intention to dispose of the property and she expressed interest in purchasing it so they agreed at the price of $100, 000.00 and she paid $30, 000.00, $35,000.00 and $22, 500.00 to him but it the agreement was not documented and he did not give her any receipt. She said the transaction was not documented because the Late David Lamptey said he was going to prepare a document and receipt and ask Manet to prepare a formal transfer after she had paid the outstanding balance. The defendant said she never had an agreement with the plaintiff but with the late David Lamptey and paid him over $80, 000.00 so if the plaintiff wants the house then he should refund the amount paid to her. Under cross-examination the defendant said when they came to see her at the property she told them if they were ready to pay her the money she had paid towards purchasing the house she would move out. Under cross-examination the defendant said she paid the $30,000.00, $35,000.00 and $22,500.00 to the late David Lamptey between March 2012 and July 2012. The defendant said she and the late David Lamptey were lovers. She explained that she was in a relationship with the late David Lamptey and he gave her a lot of money, every week he gave her at least GH¢10,000.00 so she had a lot of money. She stated that the money she paid to the late David Lamptey came from the money he gave her and she put some of the money into her account.  
The defendant’s case is that the late David Lamptey sold the property to her for US$100,000.00 and she paid a total of US$93,000.00 leaving an outstanding balance of US$7,000.00 which the late David Lamptey’s estate is entitled to so she counterclaimed against the plaintiff for a declaration that she is the beneficial owner of the property. She did not tender any documentary evidence nor call any witness to corroborate all or any aspect of her evidence.  
From exhibit A the disputed property was bought at US $120,000.00. The plaintiff stressed that his brother bought the property in 2011 at US $120,000.00 and it was empty and he could not have offered it for sale at US $100,000.00 after furnishing it as houses appreciate and do not depreciate in value. PW1 said the late David Lamptey never told him he wanted to sell the property and he could not have sold same because at Manet if one wants to sell his property he has to go the office to see the Marketing officer for the transaction to be completed and those of them at the site would be informed of the new ownership. PW2 stated that he knows both parties herein. He said he first met the defendant in September 2014 when she came to his 
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office looking for property to buy in that area and said she already lives there but did not indicate that she owned s property there but stated that her current abode was the subject matter of a dispute in court. PW2 said the defendant did not tell him she had bought the property in dispute from the late David Lamptey neither did she ask that Manet prepares any documentation for her in relation to the property in dispute.  PW2 said the defendant indicated her willingness to take up a property for sale, DH7 but she did not revert to them on it. According to PW2, the second time he met the defendant was in 2015 when she came to his office to enquire about a different property which belonged to somebody else who was interested in selling. Under cross-examination PW2 said if the defendant purchased the property from the late Lamptey, he would have come to Manet for the documentation for the third party.      
Learned counsel for the plaintiff in his written address submitted that the plaintiff wrote a letter titled “Reminder Notice” dated 14th September 2013 (exhibit G) to the defendant demanding her to give vacant possession of the property to him by December 2013. He said the defendant had an opportunity then to write back to the plaintiff to assert her claim of ownership to the property but she did not reply to the letter to do so. He contended that a person who pays US$93,000.00 for a property and is being asked to relinquish possession of same will very much likely raise issues of her interest in the property at the earliest opportunity to do so. He stated that the content of exhibit J1 also undermines the defendant’s claim of ownership to the disputed property. He stated that in December 2013, the plaintiff attempted to eject the defendant through the Rent Control Department, but her lawyer, Tawiah Yoyowah, by a letter dated 9th December 2013 (exhibit J1) wrote to Rent Control and informed the Rent Officer that the disputed property formed part of the estate of the late David Lamptey and that he had advised his client to institute civil proceedings to the court where the estate matter had been determined. He said exhibit J1 did not disclose any claim of ownership on the part of the defendant. It was stressed that exhibit J1 contradicts the defendant’s pleading in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Defence that Mr. Lamptey was the former owner of the disputed property. He stated that it is a well-established principle that where a party’s evidence is substantially inconsistent with his pleaded case while that of his opponent is consistent with his pleadings, the opponent’s case is preferable to the one who substantially departs from his pleadings as held in Appiah v. Takyi [198283] GLR 1.   
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Learned counsel for the plaintiff added that the provision in Clause C (1) (c) of exhibit K proves that the Executors of the estate of Mr. Lamptey do not claim any interest in the disputed property for Mr. Lamptey but rather acknowledge the fact that the plaintiff was gifted with a 3 bedroom house at Manet Estate in Nsamapowmu by David Lamptey and this evidence rids the defendant’s claim of any merit.  
In his written address learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the defendant failed to show any evidence of her purported contract with Mr. Lamptey for the sale of the property. He asserted that her purported contract for the sale of an interest in the disputed property was required by Section 2 (a) of the Conveyancing Act 1973, (NRCD 175) to be in writing or remain unenforceable. He said the defendant failed to prove any receipt for her said payments to Mr. Lamptey and there is no evidence of the said payment to the deceased person. It was submitted that Section 3 of NRCD 175 cannot avail her and save her from the strict requirement in Section 2 of the said Act to document such transactions. He cited the case of Deegbe v. Nsiah and ano. [1984-86] 1 GLR 545 where the Court of Appeal held that a contract for the sale of a house, which did not comply with Section 2 (a) of the Conveyancing Act, could not be enforced. He concluded that defendant’s claim of ownership to the disputed property is a nullity and baseless and the plaintiff has a better claim of ownership and title to the disputed property.  
An evaluation of the evidence adduced indicates that the plaintiff has discharged the burden of proof on her as required by Section 11(1) and (4) of the Evidence Act 1975 (NRCD 323). Judgment is therefore entered in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant herein for all the reliefs sought except relief (g) on interest. The defendant is ordered to pay the Ghana Cedis equivalent of all the amounts claimed and granted in US dollars.    
A counter claim is a separate claim in which the defendant becomes the plaintiff or the party with the burden of proof with respect to the reliefs sought. The evidence of both parties and the submissions made by their counsel with respect to the counterclaim has been discussed above in this judgment and I do not wish to repeat same. From the totality of the evidence adduced I have no option than to find that the defendant has not established her counterclaim and therefore same is dismissed.    
I have considered the factors stated in Order 74 rule 2(3) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47) as amended by C.I.87 and the facts and 
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circumstances of this case and award costs of GH¢5,000.00  to the plaintiff  against the defendant herein.    
     (SGD.) 
GEORGINA MENSAH-DATSA 
(JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT)    
Counsel:  
1. Mr. Godwin Mensah Sackey for Plaintiff. 
2.  Ms. Crystle Asa Eck for Defendants. 
                 