 
JUDGEMENT   By her amended statement of claim, filed on the 4th of March, 2013, the Plaintiff has sued the Defendants in this Court for the following:  
1.   A declaration that the Plaintiff is a surviving spouse of the late Professor Patrick   Twumasi  
b) An order joining the Plaintiff to the administrators to cater for her interest and/or that of her children with the late Professor Patrick Twumasi. c) A declaration that Plaintiff contributed towards the development of House No C683/26 on Kinshasa Road, East Legon Accra and is therefore entitled to a share in the said house. d) An order directing that 50% of the interest in House No. C683/26 on Kinshasa Road, East Legon, Accra be settled in favour of the Plaintiff. e) A declaration that House No 51, Adjirigano Road, on Plot No. 232, East Legon Extension is the personal property of the Plaintiff and does not form part of the property of the late Professor Patrick Twumasi. 
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The facts in support of Plaintiff’s case are that she is the surviving spouse of the late Professor Patrick Twumasi (hereafter referred to as the late Professor), the Parties, having married under customary law in the year 1983 and then subsequently under the ordinance in 1987.  She averred that the late Professor who died on the 5th of May, 2007 was survived by her, as his spouse and six children.  It is Plaintiff’s case that the first two children, who are Defendants to the present suit applied for and were granted Letters of Administration by this Court on the 10th of February, 2010 through one Karikari Boateng who acted as Attorney for the Defendants. She contends that the said Karikari Boateng lacked capacity to so act and also, that the Defendants who are ordinarily resident outside the jurisdiction are not well placed to administer the estate economically and expeditiously. Plaintiff lamented that her personal interests and that of her three children, the last of them whom was a minor at the time the action was instituted, would not be adequately protected given the choice of Administrators.  According to her, she is a joint owner of House No. C683/26, on 28 Kinshasa Road, East Legon, (hereafter referred to as the Kinshasa house) by reason of her contributions to the construction of the said house.  She averred that she contributed to the construction of the said house with income derived from her baby sitting job abroad.  She alleges that she assisted in paying off a mortgage facility of Eighty Thousand Cedis (&#572;80,000.00) taken to finish the block works and also financed the furnishing of the said house. This house, she maintains, served as the matrimonial home which she continued to live in even after the death of the late Professor until his customary successor forced her out with death threats.  
As regards House No 51, Adjirigano Road, Plot No 232, East Legon Extension,(hereafter referred to as Adjirigano House) the Plaintiff asserts the said house is her personal property built solely out of her own resources and without assistance from anyone either in cash or in kind. This, she averred, is substantiated by the fact that all documents covering the land and the house are in her name.  
The Defendants on their part, deny the claims of the Plaintiff. They contend that the Plaintiff’s marriage to the late Professor is void and was contracted by fraud. The particulars of fraud given include the following:  
a) The Plaintiff was aware that at all times, the late Prof Twumasi was married to   Mrs. Maria Theresa Twumasi under the ordinance on the 10th day of July, 1956 at the time she met him. 
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b) The Plaintiff was fully aware that the marriage between the late Professor Twumasi and Maria Theresa Twumasi subsisted during her adulterous affair with the late Prof Twumasi. c) In the years of 1983 and 1987 when the Plaintiff claims she was married customarily and under the ordinance, the marriage between the late Prof Twumasi and the late Mrs. Maria Theresa Twumasi subsisted. e) By reason of the monogamous marriage contracted between the late Prof. Twumasi, any marriage contracted before the death of Mrs. Maria Twumasi is bigamous in law, null and void.   
Defendants contend that the late Professor’s wife left Ghana to care for her ailing and aged parents and not because of the collapse of her marriage to the late Professor.  They charge that the Plaintiff being a concubine, has no stake in the Estate of the late Professor even though her children do. They vehemently deny that Plaintiff has an interest in any of the houses in dispute as she did not make any contributions to the acquisition of same. Defendants allege that the Kinshasa house was constructed by the late Professor with a housing loan obtained from the University of Ghana and with the assistance of   Maria Ann Therisa who they described as his only wife.  They vehemently denied the Plaintiff’s claims that she was engaged in employment of any sort during the period she cohabited with the late Professor and aver that the fact that she remained unemployed during that period was admitted by the Plaintiff herself in her tribute to the late Professor.  They assert that the late Professor having earned a decent income as a University Professor, Consultant to the WHO and Ambassador to Zimbabwe among other well-paying jobs was more than capable of building  both the Kinshasa house and the Adjirigano house which they described as “luxurious” without any financial assistance from Plaintiff.  The Plaintiff’s allegation that the customary successor threatened to kill her was also denied by the Defendants.   At the close of pleadings, a number of issues were set down for trial.  I however agree with Counsel for Plaintiff that the issues relevant to the determination of the present suit are:  1. Whether or not Plaintiff’s purported ordinance marriage to the late Professor Patrick Twumasi is valid. 2. Whether or not the Plaintiff has an interest in House No. C683/26 on 28 Kinshasa Road, East Legon, Accra 
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3. Whether or not House No 51 Adjirigano is the personal property of Professor Tsumasi and therefore forms part of his estate. 4. Whether or not Plaintiff and/or her children by the late Professor Patrick Twumasi is/are entitled to be joined as Administrators of the Estate of the late Professor Patrick Twumasi.   
In her testimony before this Court, Plaintiff stated that she was married to the late Professor customarily in 1983.  She asserts that subsequently, the Parties were married under the ordinance at the St Thomas Aquinas Church, University of Ghana, Legon. In proof of this, Plaintiff tendered in evidence EXHIBIT A, a marriage certificate dated the 26th day of December, 1987.  It is the case of Plaintiff that, prior to her marriage to the late Professor, he informed her that he had been previously married to a Dutch woman with whom he had four children but that the marriage had been dissolved.  She contends that her marriage to the late Professor was no secret both to his family and to his former wife.  She says they all recognized her as the wife and referred to her as Mrs. Nana Amma Twumasi. To prop up this assertion, Plaintiff tendered EXHIBITS F and G being the obituary notice issued upon the death of a son of the late Professor. In the said Exhibits, Plaintiff is described as his wife whereas his first wife, Maria Anna Theresa is described “the mother of the deceased.” EXHIBITS J and J1, letters addressed to Mrs. Maria Twumasi and dated the 14th day of August, 1965 and the 1st day of February, 1968 respectively were also tendered by Plaintiff to show that Maria Anna Therisa Sleegers had not always used her maiden name. Plaintiff’s point is that Maria Anna Therisa reverted to using her maiden name ‘Sleegers” because her marriage to the late Professor had been dissolved.  EXHIBITS B, C, D and E were also tendered as evidence that the late Professor’s family recognized Plaintiff as his widow. Plaintiff therefore urges on this Court to hold, based on the foregoing, that the Defendants cannot deny the validity of her marriage to the late Professor.   
From the evidence led in this Court, I am in no doubt at all, that both the late Professor and his family recognized Plaintiff as a wife. I am even driven to conclude from the conduct of the first woman he married, the late Maria Anna Therisa, that, even if her marriage to the late Professor had not been formally dissolved at the time of his purported marriage to the Plaintiff, she did indeed recognize or condone the alleged bigamous marriage of the late Professor to the Plaintiff.  Although Defendants allege that she had on occasion protested against the relationship between the late 
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Professor and Plaintiff, no cogent evidence was led in this Court to substantiate this allegation. On the contrary, EXHIBITS F and G attest to the fact that the late Maria Anna Theresa knew and accepted Plaintiff’s status as the wife of the late Professor. Whether or not this was borne out of frustration or the mistaken belief that time and distance and had resulted in a dissolution of her marriage to the late Professor is unclear.   
It is noted that at Common law, a valid marriage will be presumed even where a couple, though not formally married, consent to live together and present themselves as husband and wife in the eyes of the whole world and are recognized as such.   
Plaintiff says that she and the late Professor were first married under customary law and then subsequently under the ordinance.  Even though no satisfactory evidence was led in this Court to show that the customary marriage actually took place, exhibit A is evidence that the Plaintiff and the late Professor entered into an ordinance marriage on the 26th of December, 1987 at the Catholic Chapel, Mensah Sarbah Hall, Legon, in the presence of witnesses. In Ghana a marriage is presumed valid only upon proof of two conditions.  Firstly, that the celebration of the marriage actually took place and secondly that it was in the presence of witnesses.  See Section 31 of the Evidence Act, Act, 323.   
Under the said section, a marriage which has been celebrated before witnesses is presumed valid.  The authenticity of EXHIBIT A remains unchallenged. I therefore do not think that the fact that none of the members of the late Professor’s family attended, even if true, changes the fact that the said ceremony took place. I also do not know of any law that makes it a condition precedent for a person to be formally invited to the celebration of a marriage before such a person can attest to the celebration of same.  The issue of whether or not the wife of DW1 was invited to the said celebration is therefore, in my opinion, of no consequence to determining the validity or otherwise of the marriage contracted between the late Professor and the Plaintiff.  Having mounted a challenge to the Plaintiff’s claim of being the surviving spouse of the late Professor, the onus fell on the Defendants to prove that the marriage contracted between Plaintiff and the late Professor was invalid and therefore not deserving of recognition.   
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DW1, tendered in evidence EXHIBIT 1, the marriage certificate evidencing the marriage contracted between the late Professor and Maria Anna Therisa Sleegers on the 10th day of July 1956. The Plaintiff, for her part, does not challenge the authenticity of EXHIBIT 1 or deny that the said marriage took place. Indeed on the 14th day of January, 2015, she testified in this Court (differently constituted), as follows: “……when my husband proposed to marry me, he told me that once he married a Dutch woman but the marriage was dissolved”.   
Flowing from the above, the fact of the late Professor having contracted a prior valid, monogamous marriage at the time he met the Plaintiff was not in dispute. This fact having been established, the evidentiary burden now shifted onto the Plaintiff to prove that the marriage between the late Professor and Maria Ann Theresa Sleegers had been dissolved at the time of her ordinance marriage to the late Professor in 1987. This, to my mind, is an issue which required positive proof and not one to be inferred from the conduct of the Parties.  In the case of ABABIO AND AKWASI III [1994-95] 1GBR 774, the Supreme Court had this to say at page 777: “The general principle of law is that it is the duty of a Plaintiff to prove his case, ie he must prove what he alleges. In other words, it is the Party who raises in his pleadings an issue essential to the success of his case who assumes the burden of proving it. The burden only shifts to the defence to lead sufficient evidence to tip the scales in his favour when on a particular issue, the Plaintiff leads some evidence to prove his claim. If the Defendant succeeds in doing this he wins, if not, he looses on that particular issue.”    
Though I have already found that the Plaintiff during the lifetime of the late Professor was held out and recognized as his wife, the position of the law, which is well – settled, is that a marriage contracted under the Marriage Ordinance (Cap 127) when either Party is already lawfully married to another either customarily or under the ordinance is null and void. Indeed Section 13(4) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, Act 367, emphasizes this legal position by stating that “Nothing in the section shall be construed as validating a marriage which is by law void but with respect to which a decree of nullity has not been granted.” This means that a void marriage remains void whether or not so declared by a Court of competent jurisdiction.  Thus in the case of   GENFI V GENFI,  SOWAH J as he then was, had no difficulty  declaring that a marriage, solemnized under the Marriage Ordinance, Cap 127 was null and void due 
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to a prior existing customary marriage between Petitioner and another woman. Also, of significance are Sections 262 and 263 of the Criminal Offences Act, Act 29, which makes it an offence for a person to contract another marriage during the subsistence of prior valid monogamous marriage between him or her and another person. The above authorities demonstrate the inflexibility of this legal principle and reveals the evidentiary hurdle Plaintiff was required to surmount in order to establish that she was a lawful wife of the late Professor.  Quite clearly, in the light of the above mentioned authorities, any view that the Plaintiff, the late Professor, his family or his wife Maria Anna Therisa held of the Plaintiff’s status did not or could not have changed the true legal position.   
In the face of EXHIBITS 1 and 7 tendered in proof of a subsisting marriage between the late Professor and the late Maria Anna Theresa, who was alive at the time of his purported marriage to Plaintiff, a burden was cast on Plaintiff to lead cogent and credible evidence in proof of her claim that the said marriage had been dissolved. What I garner from the evidence of Plaintiff, is an invitation to this Court to infer from the circumstances of this case, that there was no valid marriage subsisting at the time she married the late Professor. I do not think this is a matter in which a dissolution should be inferred. The dissolution of an ordinance marriage in my opinion, is capable of positive proof. This proof, the Plaintiff failed to offer. The Plaintiff’s bare assertion that the late Professor told her the marriage had been dissolved will not suffice, for even if he did, where is the evidence that he was telling her the truth?  
I am therefore quite unable to find that the marriage contracted between Plaintiff and the late Professor was valid in law. On the evidence, this Court can only describe the status of Plaintiff as that of a concubine, for, though she permanently cohabited with the late Professor, the said relationship was “without the benefit of marriage”. See definition of “concubine” in the BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY {8TH EDITION}  I accordingly hold that Plaintiff is not a surviving spouse of the late Professor.   
The next issue to examine is whether Plaintiff has an interest in the Kinshasa house.  The Plaintiff claims a share in the said house on the basis that she contributed towards the development and completion of the house with income from her baby sitting job abroad.  Now, before I proceed any further to evaluate the evidence led by the Plaintiff in support of this assertion, I consider it necessary to point out the well-established legal 
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principle that a claim against a dead person should be viewed with the utmost suspicion and examined critically by a Court or tribunal of fact before it accepts same as the truth. As held in the case of AMANKWAH V NSIAH (1994-95) GBR PT II @ 758, the general standard of proof on a balance of probabilities required in civil matters will not suffice in such cases. This is because the deceased against whom the claim is made will not be in the position to state his side of the story to enable the Court ascertain the veracity or otherwise of the claims being made against him or her.  In the case of AMANKWAH V NSIAH (supra) BROBBEY, JA as he then was, in explaining the policy reasons behind the principle regarding evidence against dead persons, had this to say at page 763 “...A person who chooses to make claims does so after the protagonist is dead because he may be presumed to be aware that if the protagonist were alive he would be able readily to produce evidence to disprove those claims. He chooses to make the claim after his death because it is his intention to smother or conceal the truth by his own belief that the only person to challenge him effectively is in the grave. This, to my mind, is the main reason why almost all authorities on the issue emphasize that such claims should be viewed with utmost suspicion.”  See also the cases of MOSES V ANANE [1989-90]2 GLR 140 and the Supreme Court case of FENUKU AND JOHN TEYE [2001-2002] SCGLR 985  
In assessing the evidence of the Plaintiff therefore, this Court will be guided by this well-received principle.    
The Plaintiff gave the following responses under cross-examination; Q. The Kinshasa house, you made no input in the construction A. That is not true  Q. Prof took a loan from the university to put up the house, A. I said he took 50,000 to construct the building  Q. He used his salary as Professor and Ambassador to put up the house. A. Prof further took 80,000 to develop the property. The property was not fully developed and as a result of our travels on sabbatical we combined resources to develop the property which became my matrimonial home till he was appointed ambassador.  
Having regard to my earlier finding that the Plaintiff was not in law a spouse of the late Professor, I think it is quite clear that the Kinshasa house cannot be described as a 
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matrimonial home, for, a matrimonial home is supposed to be property occupied by a husband and wife as their ordinary place of residence. The Plaintiff, having been found not to have been lawfully married to the late Professor can therefore not describe the said house as her matrimonial home. In any event, Plaintiff claims a share of the Kinshasa house not by virtue of her purported marriage to the late Professor but because she is supposed to have contributed to the acquisition of same. She avers in her paragraphs 8 and 9 of her amended statement of claim, that it was she who financed the tiling, wardrobing and other furnishing of the Kinshasa house. She alleges that she was able to do so from income derived from her baby sitting job abroad. This allegation has been vehemently denied by the Defendants. It is trite that, it is the Plaintiff who bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence on her claims to avoid a ruling being made against her on the issue. See sections 11(1) and (4) of the Evidence Act, Act 323.  In the case of KLAH v PHOENIX INSURANCE (2012)2GLR 1139, the Supreme Court, emphasized the duty imposed on a Plaintiff to lead evidence in proof of matters alleged in his or her pleadings .The Court at page 1150 stated as follows “..since a Party’s pleadings constitute allegations as opposed to evidence: where an averment is positively denied, as in the matter under consideration, it is incumbent on the party asserting those averments, to substantiate them by leading evidence thereon.”  
I find from the record that no evidence was led to substantiate the Plaintiff’s claims. It is quite clear from the evidence on record that the late Professor during his lifetime treated the Kinshasa house as his personal property and did not consider the Plaintiff or any other person as part owner of same. EXHIBITS 5 and 6 are ample evidence of this fact. The said Exhibits show that the late Professor, in his capacity as landlord, in the years of 2003 and 2004 respectively, let out the said property to two different persons without any reference to Plaintiff.  In 2004, it was the late Professor who solely took the decision to extend the tenancy for another year as indicated in EXHIBIT 5. The Plaintiff neither disputes the authenticity of EXHIBITS 5 and 6 nor denies that the said house was rented out by the Professor in his capacity as landlord. Nowhere in these agreements did Plaintiff feature as joint- owner of the said property. Neither is there any evidence on record that the Plaintiff during the lifetime of the late Professor ever breathed a word of being part owner of the said house by virtue of her alleged contributions.  Quite clearly, the late Professor did not recognize her as such. Given the fact that the late Professor, treated and used the Kinshasa house as his personal property without any objection from Plaintiff,   Plaintiff carried the onerous 
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burden of leading compelling evidence to oust any presumption that the late Professor was its sole owner.  This, she woefully failed to do in my opinion. On the contrary, Plaintiff on the 20th of February, 2015, testified as follows in her evidence-in -chief …. “After the completion of the widowhood rights, Yaw Tsumasi ordered me to quit his brother’s house, my late husband’s house at 28 Kinshasa Road”.  Again, under cross-examination she was asked; Q. You moved him when he was terminally ill and he died. A. He wanted to die in his own house.   
By the Plaintiff’s own showing, the Kinshasa house was the late Professor’s “own house” and not one of which she was part owner as alleged.   
The Plaintiff contends that it was income derived from her baby sitting job abroad that she contributed towards the development of the said house. It is interesting to note however, that not a jot or scintilla of evidence was led by the Plaintiff to establish this allegation. As held in the celebrated case of MAJOLAGBE V LARBI, 1GLR 190 @ 192, “… Proof in law is the establishment of a fact by proper legal means…when a party makes an averment capable of proof in some positive way…and the averment is denied, he does not prove it by merely going into the witness box to repeat his averments on oath.”   
Now, bearing in mind the fact that Plaintiff had herself admitted in her EXHIBIT E that she, at the request of the late Professor, had given up her teaching job to focus on the family, I am compelled to take a jaundiced view of Plaintiff’s claims that she worked as a baby sitter during her sojourn abroad. Even if she did, I do not see how this Court in the light of her failure to adduce sufficient evidence in support of her claims of having contributed to the acquisition of the Kinshasa house, can grant her  prayer for a declaration that she is entitled to a  50% share of the said  house. The inescapable conclusion I come to is that the Plaintiff failed to produce such evidence because she had none.   I therefore hold that the Plaintiff is not entitled to a share of the Kinshasa house as the same was acquired solely out of the resources of the late Professor without any contribution from Plaintiff.  
I now turn to the vexed issue of ownership of the Adjirigano house which has been described as “the mansion” in this Court. However, before proceeding to address the said issue, I will pause here to examine the probative value of EXHIBITS 3 and 4, 
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tendered by DW3, a lawyer by profession and one who testified to his close relationship with the late Professor.  This is because I am of the view that determining the probative value of the said Exhibits will greatly assist the Court in making any findings regarding the ownership of the Adjirigano house. Let me however stress that, this Court is very alive to the fact that the said Exhibits are of no legal force and effect as far as the testamentary dispositions made therein are concerned, for, the purported Will has not been duly executed in accordance with Section 2 of the Wills Act, Act 360.   
DW3 testified that the contents of EXHIBIT 3 were the hand written instructions given him by the late Professor during his lifetime for the preparation of his Will which he accordingly did, as evidenced by EXHIBIT 4. The Plaintiff on the other hand vehemently denies that EXHIBIT 3 was authored by the late Professor. It is her case that the writing in the said exhibit is unfamiliar to her.  I am in no doubt at all that the Plaintiff, having had a close and intimate relationship with the late Professor for well over 20 years should be able to recognize his writing when she sees it.  Plaintiff does not dispute the fact that DW3 who was related to the late Professor also had a close personal and professional relationship with him. Indeed, his testimony that it was he who prepared EXHIBIT 5 on behalf of the late Professor was not challenged by Plaintiff. This, to my mind, makes it highly probable that he also would have had occasion to see the late Professor’s handwriting.    DW3 insists, that there is no doubt that EXHIBIT 3 was written by the late Professor and truly represented the intentions of the latter though the same was not executed. In view of the conflicting claims, I believe my task at this stage is to ascertain, based on the evidence before me, whether the late Professor was indeed the author of EXHIBIT 3.   It is trite learning that a Court is entitled to examine documents in cases of disputed handwriting in order to draw its own inferences and to come to its conclusions. In the case of FENUKU v JOHN TEYE (supra), where there was a dispute relating to the signature of a deceased, the Court was of the opinion that the issue could be resolved by examining the disputed signatures and comparing them with those admitted by the opponent to be genuine. Fortified by this authority and several others such as the STATE V LAWMAN [1961] GLR [PT II] 698, I have taken time to critically examine EXHIBIT 3.  I have gone on to carefully compare this Exhibit with EXHIBITS 2, 2A 2B and 2C. These are Exhibits which Plaintiff by implication concedes are genuine due to her reliance on them as proof of her status as 
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a wife. Upon such critical examination, I find that it can hardly be argued with any persuasiveness that EXHIBIT 3 was not written by the late Professor. Although the characters in EXHIBIT 3 appear smaller, the similarity between the writing in EXHIBITS 3 and EXHIBITS 2(A) to (C) is so striking and readily noticeable even to the untrained eye, that I find the Plaintiff’s claim that the said writing is unfamiliar to her, rather hard to believe. As Plaintiff stated in her EXHIBIT E, having served as the late Professor’s “Chamber Dictionary” by constantly reading through his writings before the same were published, she, in my opinion ought to have had no difficulty recognizing the writing in EXHIBIT 3, as that of the late Professor. I am inclined to think that Plaintiff is not being candid with this Court when she says the handwriting in EXHIBIT 3 is unfamiliar to her and therefore not that of the late Professor. I am in no doubt that EXHIBIT 3 was written by the late Professor and accordingly find that it was he wrote same.   
It however bears repeating that this finding does not in any way lend validity to EXHIBIT 4 which has not been executed in accordance with the relevant statute. There indeed is no question regarding the fact that the late Professor died intestate.  
Having come to this conclusion, I now proceed to deal with whether the Adjirigano house forms part of the Estate of the late Professor or is the self-acquired property of the Plaintiff.  
In doing so, I remain mindful of the salutary principle laid down in the AMANKWA case (supra) regarding how the Court is to view claims made against the dead.  
To my mind, the Plaintiff, given the circumstances of this case, carried the same if not a heavier burden of proving her claim to the Adjirigano house strictly and beyond a mere balance of probabilities as she was required to do, in the case of the Kinshasa house.   
The Plaintiff asserts ownership to the Adjirigano house. In a bid to establish her financial status and ability to acquire the said Property without financial assistance from any quarters, she tendered in evidence EXHIBITS T series and U series. EXHIBITS Q, S and V series and W series were also tendered in proof of Plaintiff’s ownership of the said property. The Plaintiff testified as follows on the 27th of January, 2015  
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“Plot No 232, 51 Adjirigano is mine and I put up a house on it. When my husband was appointed a High Commissioner to Zimbabwe, I established a Kente business and other items. Out of these, I raised funds to build my house. I purchased materials from East Legon and other places.”  
She stated further under cross-examination,  “..When we went to Zimbabwe, I traded in Africa wear, boubou, kente and engaged with my fellow ambassador wives. I engaged in that trade, the business flourished and the Ghana community patronized my wares, the trade was international, in a bad month I was collecting Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5000.00) as from 1994 1998. A good month I collect about Eleven Thousand (11,000.00) From Zimbabwe, I brought other items, pot puree and dogs for sale.”    From the above testimony, Plaintiff paints a picture of having established herself as an entrepreneur of high repute between the years of 1994 – 1998. I gather from the record that this is about the period within which the Adjirigano house was constructed. According to her, this business thrived until the late Professor was made Presidential Advisor to the then President Rawlings. I find that Plaintiff failed to explain how the said appointment resulted in the collapse of her business. Be that as it may, Plaintiff described her kente business as international.  In fact, from her evidence, not only did she trade in kente, but she also dealt in landscaping, pot pourri, and even in dogs. Having done business on such a large scale during the period in issue, one would have expected these matters to have been pleaded by the Plaintiff, especially since the kente business is supposed to have been her main source of income, for the construction of the Adjirigano house. Curiously however, this fact was not pleaded. In THE CASE OF WHITAKER V NANAKA BRUCE AND ANOR,  [1994-95] GBR, 784, BROBBEY JA (as he then was) at page 787, in conceding that material facts could not be clearly distinguished from material evidence, was of the view that, what was required, was for the Plaintiff  to give “reasonable information” to the Defendant in the pleadings. Sharing in this view, I believe that Plaintiff, having deemed it necessary to mention that she earned income as a baby sitter which she allegedly contributed towards the construction of the Kinsasha  house, ought to have disclosed the source from which she financed the construction of the Adjirigano house in her pleadings especially since she appears to place a lot of premium on the same. By her failure to do so, Plaintiff’s evidence about the kente, landscaping and dog 
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business, etc can best be described as an “out of the blue” story.  This, from the record, only popped up when she mounted the witness box. Although, no objection was raised to this piece of evidence, it still induces in me the feeling that the story was an afterthought made up in an attempt to overreach the Defendants. I am therefore not impressed by it.  
In her evidence in this Court, Plaintiff gave a long list of customers who patronized her wares. No evidence, oral or documentary was provided to corroborate the Plaintiff’s assertions.  Due to the “international” nature of the Plaintiff’s business, one would have also expected her to provide documentary evidence such as bank statements, invoices, sales receipts, income tax returns, evidence of exports etc in support of her case.  No such documentary evidence was produced in this Court.  I do not think EXHIBIT U series is sufficient proof that Plaintiff was engaged in kente business from which she derived such huge income. After all, mere evidence of purchase of kente cloth does not necessarily prove that Plaintiff sold and earned income from same. The Plaintiff failed to link the evidence of these purchases to her alleged earnings. Indeed the said kente cloth, granting that they were truly purchased, could have been for any other purpose, the Court cannot for instance, rule out the possibility that the said purchases, even if truly made, were on another persons behalf. EXHIBIT U series are therefore, in my opinion of very little or no any probative value as far the Plaintiff’s claim of having engaged in such lucrative business is concerned.  
Plaintiff also tendered in evidence EXHIBIT S and Q, the indenture and receipt respectively allegedly issued her by the grantors of the land, on which the Adjirigano house is situate. EXHIBIT S is dated the 27th day of October, 2010.  According to Plaintiff, upon her purchase of the land in 1991, she was issued with EXHIBIT Q, Subsequently, in 1993 she was given an indenture. This indenture, according to her, was later recalled by her grantors on grounds that they needed to replace it with new one to reflect a Supreme Court decision given in 2008, declaring them owners of the said land. According to her, it is then that her grantors issued EXHIBIT S, a new indenture to her. Both Plaintiff and PW1, a representative of the alleged grantor were unable to produce copies of the original indenture. I must say I find it rather strange that there is no trace of such an important document. PW1 alleged that they had destroyed all the old indentures because they had no place to keep them. I consider this excuse given by PW1 rather weak but I have no good reason to disbelieve him. It 
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is however surprising that, Plaintiff would return such an all-important document without keeping a copy. From the record, Plaintiff, a teacher by profession and a woman of considerable intelligence appears to fully appreciate the importance of record keeping. The Exhibits tendered by her in this Court will attest to this fact. Plaintiff was able to produce EXHIBIT Q, said to have been issued in 1991. EXHIBIT T series and U series, all bearing dates ranging from 1994 – 1997 were also tendered. It is even interesting to note that Plaintiff managed to produce letters written and addressed to the late Professor’s wife Maria Anna, which date as far back as 1965, and tendered as EXHIBITS J and J1 in proof of her case. The Plaintiff’s assertion that she does not have a copy of the original indenture sounds unconvincing to me. It indeed makes me wonder if Plaintiff was just imprudent in not keeping a copy of the old indenture or whether she failed to produce it because she did not have one bearing her name as the original Lessee.  
It is to be noted, that contrary to the evidence of Plaintiff that the original indenture was given to her in 1993, PW1 testified that it was given to Plaintiff in 1991. Though this inconsistency in my honest opinion is quite immaterial, certain observations I have made of EXHIBIT S cause me to question its validity. The Oath of Proof attesting to the due execution of EXHIBIT S by the Lessors is dated the 24th of September, 2014. On the other hand, apart from the interlineations which give me cause for concern, the stamp evidencing receipt of the indenture by Land Valuation Division for stamping is dated 18 /9 /2012  and 20/9/12 respectively.  By this, what Plaintiff seems to be telling this Court is that the stamping of EXHIBIT S pre-dated the swearing of Oath proving its due execution by Plaintiff’s grantors. This, in the normal course of events should not be the case.  Since no evidence was led by Plaintiff in explanation of this inconsistency, I am impelled to conclude that EXHIBIT S is of doubtful validity.  
That said, it remains to be pointed out that proof of ownership of the land does not amount to proof ownership of the house. In the AMANKWAH case (supra).  BROBBEY JA, reiterating this principle, at page 760 referred to the Supreme Court case of KWAME AND SERWA [1993-94]1GLR 429 where it was held that; “Ownership of the house should be proved distinctly from ownership of the land on which it is situated and further that the ownership of the land and the house could be decreed in favour of different people.”    
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It was further held in the same case that “Proof of ownership of the house should be by inter alia evidence of actual construction and other acts of ownership after its completion”.  
 Thus assuming without necessarily admitting, that the Plaintiff has by EXHIBITS S and Q succeeded in establishing title to the land in question, this does not put the issue regarding her ownership of the said house beyond dispute.  By relief (e) of her writ of summons, the Plaintiff’s prayer is for “a declaration that house NO 51, Adjirigano Road on plot 232, East Legon Extension is the personal property of Plaintiff and does not form part of the estate of Estate of the late Professor Patrick Twumasi.”   
On the face of the pleadings, ownership of the land on which the said house is situate is not in issue. I will therefore in line with the reasoning of the Court in the AMANKWAH case (supra) confine myself to the determination of who owns the said house.   
EXHIBIT T series have been tendered by Plaintiff as proof of purchase of building materials. I note that some of the exhibits like EXHIBITS T6 and T7 do not state the cost of the materials purchased. No explanation was given for this omission.  According to Plaintiff she only had a ‘few’ receipts to show to the Court. Again, as owner of the house, no explanation was offered for her failure to produce most, even if not all the receipts issued for the building materials she allegedly purchased. This Court notes further that, none of the artisans or workmen she is supposed to have employed to undertake the said construction were called to corroborate her claims.  Having constructed the said property wholly out of her own resources, I would have expected her to lead clear and cogent evidence to establish this assertion, by for example, producing a building permit. No such evidence was tendered.    As already stated in this judgement, it would be most unsafe for this Court to rely solely on the uncorroborated evidence of Plaintiff as proof of her ownership of the said house, when the late Professor is not here to deny or admit the said allegations.  Not surprisingly, the Defendants vehemently deny the claims of Plaintiff. DW2 was one witness who testified on behalf of defendants. He said, that the late Professor was his uncle and insisted that the said house was acquired solely by the late Professor without any financial contribution whatsoever from Plaintiff. To substantiate his contentions, he testified to the various distinguished positions held by the late 
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Professor during his life time. These included having served as Ghana’s Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Consultant to WHO and a Lecturer at the University of Ghana. This piece of evidence of DW2 is indeed corroborated by the Plaintiff herself. Plaintiff in her affidavit sworn to on the 23rd day of August, 2010 in support of her application for interlocutory injunction describes the late Professor as “a noted Sociologist, academician and diplomat.”  DW2 contended that having served in these distinguished positions, his uncle had the wherewithal to construct the said house and did indeed construct same without any financial help from the Plaintiff. He tendered in evidence EXHIBITS 2A, 2B and 2C to bolster his assertions. In considering the probative value of the said exhibits, it is significant to note that Plaintiff does not challenge their authenticity.  I actually observe as already stated, that Counsel for Plaintiff relied on references made in those letters by the late Professor to Plaintiff as his wife to buttress the Plaintiff’s claims of being his surviving spouse. It is also worthy of note, that it is not the case of either Party that the late Professor owned any other building or buildings elsewhere.  This leads me to conclude that any reference “my old and new house” by the late Professor amounts to reference no other properties but those in dispute. A reading of EXHIBITS 2 – 2D confirm to me that the late Professor put DW2 in charge of his properties during the period that he and Plaintiff travelled round the world. In EXHIBIT 2D, he states “please continue to look after the house”.  Again in EXHIBIT 2B, he pleads with DW2 to “continue to check as always if everything is ok at my old and new houses”.  Contrary to the view held by Counsel for Plaintiff, I do not think the inability of the witness to provide evidence of remittances for construction is proof that he did not supervise the construction of the house in the light of these compelling pieces of evidence found in EXHIBIT 2 series.   
 I also find that EXHIBIT 2B dated the 9th day of October, 1995, corroborates the evidence of DW2 that the Plaintiff was never engaged in any gainful employment during the period in issue. He testified that Plaintiff had to approach him for financial assistance at some point. The first paragraph of the said exhibit reads “…my wife arrived safely yesterday……I am always grateful for the role you continue to play for us. I managed to send her just before she left Ghana, $2000 thus her inability to see you again. Now, it remains Duke Papas cement …. Please endeavor to go there and maintain that I will remit him soon.”  
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What I glean from the above, is a confirmation of the evidence of DW2 that Plaintiff fell into some financial difficulty during the period that the said house was under construction. I believe that this was the reason why the late Professor found it necessary to send her $2000 during her stay in Ghana at the time.  The contradiction between the picture painted by Plaintiff of her financial standing as at 1995 and the reality as evidenced by EXHIBIT 2B is quite obvious. The natural question is, if Plaintiff was truly the wealthy business woman she claims she was at the time, why was it necessary for the late Professor to send her  $2000 during her stay here and why was she unable to pay for ‘Duke Papa’s cement’ before leaving Ghana? Quite apart from the fact that the said Exhibit reveals Plaintiff’s total reliance on the late Professor for her upkeep, it also demonstrates that the said construction was funded solely from his resources.  I am further strengthened in this view by EXHIBIT W series. These were tendered by Plaintiff to prove that she took loans from the bank to complete the Adjirigano house. I must say firstly, that apart from the fact that the evidence on record shows that the said house was completed and actually occupied by the late Professor on his return from Zimbabwe in the late 90’s, there is no evidence that the said loan even if taken by Plaintiff  was used to complete or develop the said house. EXHIBIT W series relates to a loan taken in 2008 which was after the death of the late Professor. In my view if EXHIBIT W series prove anything at all, it is the fact that Plaintiff could not have built the Adjirigano house. This is because, as the evidence shows, it is only after the late Professor’s death that Plaintiff took up a job following which she applied for a loan of Ten Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH&#572;10,000.00). EXHIBIT W series do not specify which “PROJECT” the loan was taken for. But even if it was taken to complete the said house, it is rather curious that this only became necessary after the death of the Professor.  
The only inference this Court can draw from this state of affairs is that Plaintiff found herself in dire straits following the loss of her only source of livelihood. In other words, the late Professor who “made sure (she) never had cause to regret her decision” to give up her teaching career was no more.   
As earlier observed, apart from the assertions of Plaintiff which I consider unsubstantiated, there is absolutely no evidence of before this Court that Plaintiff ever worked during the period that the late Professor was alive. It is therefore little wonder that the late Professor in EXHIBIT 3 expressed the real fear that “my present wife will find it difficult to look after the children…”  I find that all the surrounding facts 
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and circumstances of this case tend to corroborate the Defendants’ position that Plaintiff is not the owner of the Adjirigano house as she was not financially capable of putting up same.  
 Also instructive is the evidence of DW4, a contractor who was engaged to work on the said house.  Although the witness appeared to have a hazy recollection of the actual work he did, I am persuaded by the nature of his evidence that he was being truthful. DW4 testified that it was the late Professor who engaged him to construct the said house. He stated that he had occasion to purchase building materials sometimes with the Plaintiff and sometimes with the late Professor. Though he did not challenge this assertion, Counsel for Plaintiff sought to contend under cross-examination, that DW4 was not in the position to know who provided monies for the said purchases. I must agree with Counsel on that score but this, in my view, is a case in which the facts speak for themselves. In the face of the lack of evidence that Plaintiff was employed at the time the said house was constructed, the said monies could have come from no other person than the late Professor. The evidence of Defendants to that effect, as well as the Plaintiff’s own admission in EXHIBIT E , her tribute to the late Professor, is ample evidence of this fact. Put against this admission, the fact that certain documents like EXHIBITS T and V series, bear the name of Plaintiff does not advance her case in anyway. Indeed this can be explained away by the evidence on record showing that it was Plaintiff who supervised construction of the house on behalf of the late Professor any time she visited Ghana from Zimbabwe. This fact is buttressed by EXHIBIT 2 where the late Professor states in the first paragraph that “my wife is in Ghana to put finishing touches to my new house” (emphasis mine). I do not disregard the real likelihood for couples to pool their resources together for the joint acquisition of property.  But that is not the contention of Plaintiff in this case. Plaintiff asserts that the Adjrigano house is her self-acquired property to which the late Professor made absolutely no contribution. The onus of proving this therefore lay on Plaintiff.  This onus, in my opinion she dismally failed to discharge. Plaintiff’s evidence unfortunately, does not meet the standard set by the AMANKWAH case (supra). Consequently, I find that Plaintiff has failed to satisfactorily prove that the Adjiriganor house is her personal property and thus does not form part of the estate of the late Professor. This Court does not disregard the fact that even in a valid Will, any inclusion of property which should not form part of the Estate of a Testator may be challenged and deleted therefrom. However, there is ample evidence before me that both the Kinshasa house and the Adjirigano house were acquired by the late Professor 
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through his “own hard work and discipline” as he asserts in EXHIBIT 3 and I so hold.  
On the issue of whether or not Plaintiff and or her children are entitled to join the Defendants as Administrators of the Estate of the late Professor, I think it is quite clear from my analysis of the case so far, that the late Professor died without a surviving spouse. It also appears to me that even though Plaintiff on her pleadings sought to challenge the capacity of Defendants attorney, this claim was not pursued. Plaintiff by her reliefs does not seek a revocation of the grant but for an order joining her and /or her children to the Administrators of the Estate of the late Professor Under Order 66 Rule 13 of The High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, CI 47, the children of the deceased rank first in order of priority, in the absence of a surviving spouse. The fact that the late Professor recognized Plaintiff’s children as his own is not in dispute. The question that remains to be answered however, is whether the present Administrators truly represent the interest of the children of Plaintiff.  Section 79(2) of the Administration of Estates Act, Act 63 as amended by Section 5 of the Administration of Estates Amendment Law (PNDC l13) enjoins the Court in granting Letters of Administration, to have regard to all persons interested in the Estate of the deceased. Ordinarily, the Defendants, as children of the late Professor would be deemed to represent the interest of all the deceased’s children, including the children of Plaintiff, since they are in the same class under the Intestate Succession Act, (PNDCL 111)   This Court cannot however close its eyes to the real likelihood that the relationship between the Defendants and the Plaintiff’s children will not be cordial for obvious reasons.  As held by LUTTERODT J in the case of IN RE ARMAH (Decd), ARMAH V ARMAH [1991] 1GLR 140 the Court should not only be interested in a mere administration but a smooth one.  Happily, on the evidence, all the children of Plaintiff have now attained majority. I will therefore order that one child of the Plaintiff together with the Administrator General be joined to the Defendants as co-Administrators to administer the Estate of the late Professor in accordance with The Intestate Succession Law, 1985, (PNDC 111).  It is my hope that the presence of a neutral in the person of the Administrator General will have a moderating effect on the strained relationship existing between the disputants for a smooth, economical and expeditious administration of the said Estate.  
In the result Plaintiff’s reliefs a) c) d) and e) are hereby dismissed.  Plaintiff’s relief b) is however granted subject to the orders of this Court as stipulated in this Judgement. 
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 Given the facts and circumstances of this case, I will make no order as to costs.   
                                                                                                [SGD]       AKUA SARPOMAA AMOAH (MRS.)           JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT  
Aey/….          